Strategic Delegation and Collusion: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?

Reference : Strategic Delegation and Collusion: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?


	Document type :	E-prints/Working papers : First made available on ORBilu
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : Finance
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/9530

Title :	Strategic Delegation and Collusion: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Guigou, Jean-Daniel [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF) >]
	de Lamirande, Patrick []
	Lovat, Bruno []
Publication date :	2011
Peer reviewed :	Yes
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/9530

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