Reference : Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules

	Document type :	Scientific journals : Article
	Discipline(s) :	Law, criminology & political science : Political science, public administration & international relations
	Focus Areas :	Finance
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/47449

Title :	Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Howarth, David [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC) >]
	Asimakopoulos, Ioannis [University of Luxembourg > Law]
Publication date :	Mar-2022
Journal title :	Journal of Common Market Studies
Publisher :	Blackwell
Volume :	60
Issue/season :	2
Pages :	264-282
Peer reviewed :	Yes (verified by ORBilu)
Audience :	International
ISSN :	0021-9886
e-ISSN :	1468-5965
City :	Oxford
Country :	United Kingdom
Keywords :	[en] banking union ; single resolution mechanism ; Bank recovery and resolution directive ; deposit guarantee schemes ; MREL (minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities) ; liberal intergovernmentalism
Abstract :	[en] Our contribution demonstrates and explains the ineffectiveness of European Union (EU) bank resolution rules, a core element of Banking Union. This inadequacy owes in large part to the limited access to and insufficient availability of EU resolution funds and inadequate national deposit guarantee schemes in most EU member states, in conjunction with the relatively high minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for many EU banks. In many cases, these requirements are unlikely ever to be met – particularly for retail banks most likely to require resolution in the euro periphery. We offer a liberal intergovernmentalist analysis to explain the inadequacy of the EU resolution regime by examining German and French government preferences on EU rules on bank capital requirements agreed earlier in 2013 and national deposit guarantee schemes agreed in 2014. These government preferences were shaped significantly by the preferences of national banks and bank associations.
Target :	Researchers ; Professionals ; Students ; General public
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/47449
DOI :	10.1111/jcms.13212
Other URL :	https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.13212
FnR project :	FnR ; FNR13712846 > David Howarth > BEEBS > Building Effective European Banking Supervision > 01/09/2020 > 31/08/2023 > 2019

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