Reference : Distance-Bounding Protocols: Verification without Time and Location

	Document type :	Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
	Discipline(s) :	Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
	Focus Areas :	Security, Reliability and Trust
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/37277

Title :	Distance-Bounding Protocols: Verification without Time and Location
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Mauw, Sjouke [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
	Smith, Zachary Daniel [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
	Toro Pozo, Jorge Luis [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
	Trujillo Rasua, Rolando [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Publication date :	2018
Main document title :	Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), San Francisco 21-23 May 2018
Publisher :	IEEE Computer Society
Peer reviewed :	Yes
Country :	NY
Event name :	39th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Event date :	21-05-2018 to 23-05-2018
Keywords :	[en] distance bounding ; symbolic verification ; security
Abstract :	[en] Distance-bounding protocols are cryptographic protocols that securely establish an upper bound on the physi- cal distance between the participants. Existing symbolic verification frameworks for distance-bounding protocols consider timestamps and the location of agents. In this work we introduce a causality-based characterization of secure distance-bounding that discards the notions of time and location. This allows us to verify the correct- ness of distance-bounding protocols with standard pro- tocol verification tools. That is to say, we provide the first fully automated verification framework for distance- bounding protocols. By using our framework, we con- firmed known vulnerabilities in a number of protocols and discovered unreported attacks against two recently published protocols.
Funders :	Fonds National de la Recherche - FnR
Target :	Researchers ; Professionals ; Students
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/37277
FnR project :	FnR ; FNR10188265 > Jorge Luis Toro Pozo > DBMP > Symbolic verification of distance-bounding and multipartyauthentication protocols > 01/06/2015 > 31/05/2019 > 2015

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