| Reference : Implications and Detection of DoS Attacks in OpenFlow-based Networks |
| Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book | |||
| Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science | |||
| Security, Reliability and Trust | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/29757 | |||
| Implications and Detection of DoS Attacks in OpenFlow-based Networks | |
| English | |
Hommes, Stefan  [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >] | |
| State, Radu [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >] | |
| Engel, Thomas [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >] | |
| 2014 | |
| 2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference | |
| 537-543 | |
| Yes | |
| No | |
| International | |
| 978-1-4799-3511-6 | |
| Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2014 | |
| from 08-12-2014 to 12-12-2014 | |
| IEEE | |
| Austin (TX) | |
| US | |
| [en] OpenFlow ; DoS ; flooding attack | |
| [en] In this paper, we address the potential of centralised
network monitoring based on Software-Defined Networking with OpenFlow. Due to the vulnerability of the flow table, which can store only a limited number of entries, we discuss and show the implications for a DoS attack on a testbed consisting of OpenFlow enabled network devices. Such an attack can be detected by analysing variations in the logical topology, using techniques from information theory that can run as a network service on the network controller. | |
| Interdisciplinary Centre on Security Reliability and Trust (SnT) | |
| Researchers | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/29757 | |
| 10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7036863 |
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