Delegation and Firms’ Ability to Collude: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?

Reference : Delegation and Firms’ Ability to Collude: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?


	Document type :	Scientific journals : Article
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : Finance
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/14943

Title :	Delegation and Firms’ Ability to Collude: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Guigou, Jean-Daniel [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF) >]
	de Lamirande, Patrick []
	Lovat, Bruno []
Publication date :	2013
Journal title :	China-USA Business Review
Peer reviewed :	Yes
Audience :	International
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/14943

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