| Reference : A Theory of BOT concession contracts |
| Scientific journals : Article | |||
| Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/12868 | |||
| A Theory of BOT concession contracts | |
| English | |
| Auriol, Emmanuelle [> >] | |
Picard, Pierre M.  [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA)] | |
| 2013 | |
| Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | |
| Elsevier Science | |
| 89 | |
| 187-209 | |
| Yes (verified by ORBilu) | |
| International | |
| 0167-2681 | |
| [en] Public-private-partnership ; privatization ; adverse selection ; regulation ; natural monopoly ; infrastructure ; facilities | |
| [en] In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT)
concessions when governments and Örm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-o§ between the governmentís shadow costs of Önancing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession project characteristics to the public authority at the termination of the concession. | |
| Researchers ; Students | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/12868 | |
| http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/3416/1/bot_withfigure.pdf |
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