http://hdl.handle.net/10993/75 Search this channel search https://orbilu.uni.lu/simple-search http://hdl.handle.net/10993/55993 Title: Collective Screening <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: We study a dynamic principal-agent model in which the principal is a group whose members hold heterogeneous and evolving values from an agreement with the agent. The principals collectively choose the agent’s offer, which binds all principals if the agent accepts. Learning about the agent’s private information reduces the principals’ conflicts over their joint offer, mitigating a principal’s subsequent losses if she is not decisive. As a consequence, a principal in a group prefers to screen the agent more aggressively than a single principal. We study the dynamics of the principals’ collective choice, and obtain conditions under which decisive members of the group successively trade away their decision-making authority, leading inexorably to the concentration of negotiation power in the hands of a single principal. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/55992 Title: The Politics of Collective Principals <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: We study a dynamic principal-agent model in which the principal is a group whose members hold heterogeneous and evolving values from an agreement with the agent. The principals collectively choose the agent’s offer, which binds all principals if the agent accepts. Learning about the agent’s private information reduces the principals’ conflicts over their joint offer, mitigating a principal’s subsequent losses if she is not decisive. As a consequence, a principal in a group prefers to screen the agent more aggressively than a single principal. We study the dynamics of the principals’ collective choice, and obtain conditions under which decisive members of the group successively trade away their decision-making authority, leading inexorably to the concentration of negotiation power in the hands of a single principal. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/55867 Title: Poverty in the COVID-19 Era: Real Time Data Analysis on Five European Countries <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Menta, Giorgia <br/> <br/>Abstract: Using real-time data from the University of Luxembourg’s COME-HERE nationally representative panel survey, covering more than 8,000 individuals across France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, I investigate how income distributions and poverty rates have changed from January to September 2020. I find that poverty rates increased on average in all countries from January to May and partially recovered in September. The increase in poverty is heterogeneous across countries, with Italy being the most affected and France the least; within countries, COVID-19 contributed to exacerbating poverty differences across regions in Italy and Spain. With a set of poverty measures from the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family, I then explore the role of individual characteristics in shaping different poverty profiles across countries. Results suggest that poverty increased disproportionately more for young individuals, women, and respondents who had a job in January 2020 – with different intensity across countries. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/55866 Title: Families at a Loss: The Asymmetric Relationship Between Income Changes and Child Human Capital <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Menta, Giorgia <br/> <br/>Abstract: I here assess the link between distributional changes in family income and child human capital. Using a value-added model and data from a UK child cohort, I show evidence of an asymmetric effect of income gains and losses on child non-cognitive development. Only income losses are associated with a reduction in children’s socio-emotional health – with one-third of the effect operating through measures of maternal well-being – while no effect is found for income gains. This is consistent with a model of human-capital formation where the quality and quantity of parental inputs react to changes in family income asymmetrically. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/55699 Title: Human Capital Mobility, Firm Strategy, and Innovation <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Samson, Ruth Ngilisho <br/> <br/>Abstract: Human capital is at a pivotal position in the knowledge creation and diffusion paradigm; it is the fount of knowledge while being critical to firms’ absorption and amplification of knowledge. A firm’s sustained competitive advantage calls for organizational knowledge, which entails the integration of individual-specific knowledge embedded in employees. Yet, human beings possess attributes such as mobility and intrinsic motivation, whose implications conflict with the firm’s strategic objectives (e.g., sustaining a competitive advantage) and challenge the firm’s decision to invest in R&D. Further, given the dynamic nature of the technology market driven by constant innovation and competition, policymakers have an ongoing dialogue on how to establish sustainable innovation policies that protect the innovators’ interests without risking society’s welfare. As a result, it is of interest to managers, policymakers, and researchers to further understand the human capital position in the creation and diffusion of knowledge as well as the strategic and policy implications. This thesis contributes by exploring the reciprocal interrelations between human capital mobility, firm strategy, and innovation. Chapter 1 distinguishes voluntary from involuntary (forced) mobility and investigates the effect of forced mobility on the skilled workforce’s innovation performance from the perspectives of the source and recipient firms. We exploit the sudden fall of Nortel Networks as a natural experiment in a difference in differences event study. We construct a unique, comprehensive dataset by matching patent data from the United States Patents and Trademarks Office and online CV information from LinkedIn. We follow inventors’ careers with various employers between 1985 and 2010 and identify voluntary and involuntary (forced) movers while observing the innovation output measured by the annual number of patent applications. Our analysis shows that forced mobility distinctly affects inventors’ innovation performance when analyzed from the perspectives of the source and destination firms. Relative to voluntary mobility, the effect is insignificant, though negative, from the destination firm’s perspective. And relative to no mobility, the effect is negative, though insignificant from the destination firm’s perspective. These findings contribute to the literature on skilled workforce mobility as a driver for knowledge creation and diffusion, particularly forced mobility which has so far received very little attention. We also provide insights to policymakers and managers in the knowledge-intensive industry. Chapter 2 investigates human capital mobility behavior when unconstrained. How is the inter-firm mobility behavior of the skilled workforce altered when mobility constraints are lessened or are in favor of employees? Considering the sensitivity of knowledge sharing in the technology-intensive industry – driven by competition, constant innovation, and human capital capabilities – the mobility behavior of the skilled workforce when unconstrained is not explicit. We use changes in trade secrets protection regimes to identify mobility constraints and investigate the mobility behavior of the skilled workforce when these constraints are lessened. In a difference-in-differences setting, we find that establishing an employee-friendly trade secrets protection environment – lessening mobility constraints – reduces the likelihood of skilled workforce mobility. Further, we show that the negative effect is conveyed through the firm-specific innovation-related skills acquired by the skilled workforce. These findings align with our postulation on the increased skilled workforce’s intrinsic motivation to perform in response to the reinforced possibilities of applying the acquired technological know-how elsewhere. We illustrate the managerial dilemma of imperfect intellectual property protection and contribute to the research on intrinsic motivation as a catalyst for the observed mobility behavior and innovation output of employees working in R&D. Chapter 3 analyses firm strategy regarding R&D search and patenting while taking into account the dynamic shaping of the technology landscape by patent protection. Scholars have considerably explored the implications of patent protection and strategic patenting on innovation and R&D investment. Yet, we are still without a nuanced understanding of how firms should search the fragmented technology landscape, considering the various motives to patent and the dynamic shaping of the technology landscape by patent protection. Offensively? Defensively? Or adaptively based on payoff? We model innovation as a process of building technological bridges where new technological discoveries combine elements of new and precedent technologies. Simulation results of our model show that when patent protection shapes the technology landscape dynamically, it is advantageous for firms to search around “own” technologies globally in a complex product industry. In contrast, in a discrete product industry, it is advantageous for firms to search locally based on the payoff and globally either around “own” technologies or based on the payoff. We show that the search distance, appropriability regime, and adaptiveness of the payoff-based search influence the firms’ ultimate performance. Our study contributes to the existing research on organizational search and provides a distinct approach to modeling the structure and evolution of the technology landscape using network representation. We also provide managers and policymakers with insights regarding strategic R&D investment, patenting, and the implications on consumers and innovation welfare. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/55174 Title: Essays on the Prediction and Measurement of Individual Well-being <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Taye, Alemayehu Demissew http://hdl.handle.net/10993/54907 Title: Essays On Skills, Labor Market Institutions and Wage Inequality <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Grasso, Giuseppe http://hdl.handle.net/10993/54837 Title: Economic insecurity, racial anxiety, and right-wing populism <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Rebechi, Alessio; Rohde, Nicholas http://hdl.handle.net/10993/54818 Title: Chapter 62: Poverty and inequality in Australia, 2001–2018 <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Rebechi, Alessio; Rohde, Nicholas http://hdl.handle.net/10993/53471 Title: Tax Competition – An intertemporal perspective <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Paulus, Nora; Pieretti, Patrice; Zou, Benteng http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52958 Title: The Zoom City: Working From Home, Urban Productivity and Land Use <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Efthymia, Kyriakopoulouy; Picard, Pierre M <br/> <br/>Abstract: Who will benefit and who will lose from a permanent increase in working from home (WFH)? This paper investigates the impact of WFH on cities of different sizes, highlights the dangers of too much WFH, and discusses aspects of the disagreement between workers and firms. Our results suggest that WFH raises urban productivity and average wages only in large cities. We also study the optimal fraction of WFH and show that workers-residents have incentives to adopt an inefficiently high WFH scheme. The implementation of remote work in the short run---at fixed rents and wages---implies higher benefits for long-distance commuters and lower benefits or even losses for short-distance ones. It also implies benefits for some firms and losses for others, which potentially explains the low prevalence of WFH before the pandemic. Finally, we show that advances in digital technology, which increase the productivity of remote workers, lead to increased welfare benefits. A calibration exercise for the average and the largest European capital cities sheds more light on the impact of WFH on cities of different sizes. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52956 Title: Is a dynamic approach of tax games relevant ? <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Paulus, Nora; Pieretti, Patrice; Zou, Benteng http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52752 Title: Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52751 Title: Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52750 Title: Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52749 Title: Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52748 Title: Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52747 Title: Screening for Consensus : Delegation with Collective Principals <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: A group of principals collectively and sequentially screen an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous values from the relationship that may evolve over time. At each date, the principals use a collective decision rule to propose a contract to the agent. We unearth circumstances in which every non-dictatorial decision rule yields inefficiency in the form of excessive learning: relative to a single-principal benchmark, collective principals screen the agent too aggressively. They do so in order to reduce uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, and alleviate dynamic conflicts of interest between the principals that exist regardless of their static alignment. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52746 Title: The Politics of Collective Pricipals <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: A group of principals collectively and dynamically screens an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous and evolving values from the relationship. At each date, they use a collective decision rule to determine a joint offer to the agent; the principals may also amend the procedures governing how their joint offer is chosen. Our main result shows how decisive coalitions of principals voluntarily and permanently concentrate decision-making authority in a single principal. It shows that every equilibrium sequence of procedures converges to the dictatorship of a single principal. http://hdl.handle.net/10993/52745 Title: The Politics of Collective Principals <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter <br/> <br/>Abstract: A group of principals collectively and dynamically screens an agent. The principals hold heterogeneous and evolving values from the relationship. At each date, they use a collective decision rule to determine a joint offer to the agent; the principals may also amend the procedures governing how their joint offer is chosen. Our main result shows how decisive coalitions of principals voluntarily and permanently concentrate decision-making authority in a single principal. It shows that every equilibrium sequence of procedures converges to the dictatorship of a single principal.