Cryptanalysis of GGH15 Multilinear MapsCoron, Jean-Sébastien ; ; et alin Proceedings of Crypto 2016 (2016) Detailed reference viewed: 268 (2 UL)![]() Cryptanalysis of ISO/IEC 9796-1; Coron, Jean-Sébastien ; et alin Journal of Cryptology (2008), 21(1), 2751 Detailed reference viewed: 189 (0 UL) Cryptanalysis of SKINNY in the Framework of the SKINNY 2018--2019 Cryptanalysis CompetitionDerbez, Patrick ; ; Udovenko, Aleksei ![]() in Patterson, Kenneth G.; Stebila, Douglas (Eds.) Selected Areas in Cryptography -- SAC 2019 (2019) In April 2018, Beierle et al. launched the 3rd SKINNY cryptanalysis competition, a contest that aimed at motivating the analysis of their recent tweakable block cipher SKINNY . In contrary to the previous ... [more ▼] In April 2018, Beierle et al. launched the 3rd SKINNY cryptanalysis competition, a contest that aimed at motivating the analysis of their recent tweakable block cipher SKINNY . In contrary to the previous editions, the focus was made on practical attacks: contestants were asked to recover a 128-bit secret key from a given set of 2^20 plaintext blocks. The suggested SKINNY instances are 4- to 20-round reduced variants of SKINNY-64-128 and SKINNY-128-128. In this paper, we explain how to solve the challenges for 10-round SKINNY-128-128 and for 12-round SKINNY-64-128 in time equivalent to roughly 2^52 simple operations. Both techniques benefit from the highly biased sets of messages that are provided and that actually correspond to the encryption of various books in ECB mode. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 242 (1 UL) Cryptanalysis of the "Kindle" CipherBiryukov, Alex ; Leurent, Gaëtan ; Roy, Arnab ![]() in Selected Areas in Cryptography (2012) In this paper we study a 128-bit-key cipher called PC1 which is used as part of the DRM system of the Amazon Kindle e-book reader. This is the first academic cryptanalysis of this cipher and it shows that ... [more ▼] In this paper we study a 128-bit-key cipher called PC1 which is used as part of the DRM system of the Amazon Kindle e-book reader. This is the first academic cryptanalysis of this cipher and it shows that PC1 is a very weak stream cipher, and can be practically broken in a known-plaintext and even in a ciphertext-only scenario. A hash function based on this cipher has also been proposed and is implemented in the binary editor WinHex. We show that this hash function is also vulnerable to a practical attack, which can produce meaningful collisions or second pre-images. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 443 (8 UL) Cryptanalysis of the Atmel Cipher in SecureMemory, CryptoMemory and CryptoRFBiryukov, Alex ; Kizhvatov, Ilya ; Zhang, Bin ![]() in Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 9th International Conference (2011) SecureMemory (SM), CryptoMemory (CM) and CryptoRF (CR) are the Atmel chip families with wide applications in practice. They implement a proprietary stream cipher, which we call the Atmel cipher, to ... [more ▼] SecureMemory (SM), CryptoMemory (CM) and CryptoRF (CR) are the Atmel chip families with wide applications in practice. They implement a proprietary stream cipher, which we call the Atmel cipher, to provide authenticity, confidentiality and integrity. At CCS’2010, it was shown that given 1 keystream frame, the secret key in SM protected by the simple version of the cipher can be recovered in 2^39.4 cipher ticks and if 2640 keystream frames are available, the secret key in CM guarded by the more complex version of the cipher can be restored in 2^58 cipher ticks. In this paper, we show much more efficient and practical attacks on both versions of the Atmel cipher. The idea is to dynamically reconstruct the internal state of the underlying register by exploiting the different diffusion speeds of the different cells. For SM, we can recover the secret key in 2^29.8 cipher ticks given 1 keystream frame; for CM, we can recover the secret key in 2^50 cipher ticks with around 24 frames. Practical implementation of the full attack confirms our results. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 309 (2 UL) Cryptanalysis of the Full AES Using GPU-Like Special-Purpose HardwareBiryukov, Alex ; Groszschädl, Johann ![]() in Fundamenta Informaticae (2012), 114(3-4), 221-237 The block cipher Rijndael has undergone more than ten years of extensive cryptanalysis since its submission as a candidate for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in April 1998. To date, most of the ... [more ▼] The block cipher Rijndael has undergone more than ten years of extensive cryptanalysis since its submission as a candidate for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in April 1998. To date, most of the publicly-known cryptanalytic results are based on reduced-round variants of the AES (respectively Rijndael) algorithm. Among the few exceptions that target the full AES are the Related-Key Cryptanalysis (RKC) introduced at ASIACRYPT 2009 and attacks exploiting Time-Memory-Key (TMK) trade-offs such as demonstrated at SAC 2005. However, all these attacks are generally considered infeasible in practice due to their high complexity (i.e. 2^99.5 AES operations for RKC, 2^80 for TMK). In this paper, we evaluate the cost of cryptanalytic attacks on the full AES when using special-purpose hardware in the form of multi-core AES processors that are designed in a similar way as modern Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) such as the NVIDIA GT200b. Using today's VLSI technology would allow for the implementation of a GPU-like processor reaching a throughput of up to 10^12 AES operations per second. An organization able to spend one trillion US$ for designing and building a supercomputer based on such processors could theoretically break the full AES in a time frame of as little as one year when using RKC, or in merely one month when performing a TMK attack. We also analyze different time-cost trade-offs and assess the implications of progress in VLSI technology under the assumption that Moore's law will continue to hold for the next ten years. These assessments raise some concerns about the long-term security of the AES. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 327 (7 UL) Cryptanalysis of the LAKE Hash FamilyBiryukov, Alex ; ; et alin Fast Software Encryption (2009) We analyse the security of the cryptographic hash function LAKE-256 proposed at FSE 2008 by Aumasson, Meier and Phan. By exploiting non-injectivity of some of the building primitives of LAKE, we show ... [more ▼] We analyse the security of the cryptographic hash function LAKE-256 proposed at FSE 2008 by Aumasson, Meier and Phan. By exploiting non-injectivity of some of the building primitives of LAKE, we show three different collision and near-collision attacks on the compression function. The first attack uses differences in the chaining values and the block counter and finds collisions with complexity 2^{33}. The second attack utilizes differences in the chaining values and salt and yields collisions with complexity 2^{42}. The final attack uses differences only in the chaining values to yield near-collisions with complexity 2^{99}. All our attacks are independent of the number of rounds in the compression function. We illustrate the first two attacks by showing examples of collisions and near-collisions. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 249 (0 UL) Cryptanalysis of the Legendre PRF and generalizations; ; Udovenko, Aleksei et alin IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology (2020), 2020(1), The Legendre PRF relies on the conjectured pseudorandomness properties of the Legendre symbol with a hidden shift. Originally proposed as a PRG by Damgård at CRYPTO 1988, it was recently suggested as an ... [more ▼] The Legendre PRF relies on the conjectured pseudorandomness properties of the Legendre symbol with a hidden shift. Originally proposed as a PRG by Damgård at CRYPTO 1988, it was recently suggested as an efficient PRF for multiparty computation purposes by Grassi et al. at CCS 2016. Moreover, the Legendre PRF is being considered for usage in the Ethereum 2.0 blockchain. This paper improves previous attacks on the Legendre PRF and its higher-degree variant due to Khovratovich by reducing the time complexity from O(plogp/M) to O(plog^2p/M2) Legendre symbol evaluations when M≤p√4 queries are available. The practical relevance of our improved attack is demonstrated by breaking two concrete instances of the PRF proposed by the Ethereum foundation. Furthermore, we generalize our attack in a nontrivial way to the higher-degree variant of the Legendre PRF and we point out a large class of weak keys for this construction. Lastly, we provide the first security analysis of two additional generalizations of the Legendre PRF originally proposed by Damgård in the PRG setting, namely the Jacobi PRF and the power residue PRF. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 300 (10 UL) Cryptanalysis of the Loiss Stream CipherBiryukov, Alex ; ; in Selected Areas in Cryptography (2012) Loiss is a byte-oriented stream cipher designed by Dengguo Feng et al. Its design builds upon the design of the SNOW family of ciphers. The algorithm consists of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR ... [more ▼] Loiss is a byte-oriented stream cipher designed by Dengguo Feng et al. Its design builds upon the design of the SNOW family of ciphers. The algorithm consists of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a non-linear finite state machine (FSM). Loiss utilizes a structure called Byte-Oriented Mixer with Memory (BOMM) in its filter generator, which aims to improve resistance against algebraic attacks, linear distinguishing attacks and fast correlation attacks. In this paper, by exploiting some differential properties of the BOMM structure during the cipher initialization phase, we provide an attack of a practical complexity on Loiss in the related-key model. As confirmed by our experimental results, our attack recovers 92 bits of the 128-bit key in less than one hour on a PC with 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor. The possibility of extending the attack to a resynchronization attack in a single-key model is discussed. We also show that Loiss is not resistant to slide attacks. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 307 (1 UL) Cryptanalysis, Reverse-Engineering and Design of Symmetric Cryptographic AlgorithmsPerrin, Léo Paul ![]() Doctoral thesis (2017) In this thesis, I present the research I did with my co-authors on several aspects of symmetric cryptography from May 2013 to December 2016, that is, when I was a PhD student at the university of ... [more ▼] In this thesis, I present the research I did with my co-authors on several aspects of symmetric cryptography from May 2013 to December 2016, that is, when I was a PhD student at the university of Luxembourg under the supervision of Alex Biryukov. My research has spanned three different areas of symmetric cryptography. In Part I of this thesis, I present my work on lightweight cryptography. This field of study investigates the cryptographic algorithms that are suitable for very constrained devices with little computing power such as RFID tags and small embedded processors such as those used in sensor networks. Many such algorithms have been proposed recently, as evidenced by the survey I co-authored on this topic. I present this survey along with attacks against three of those algorithms, namely GLUON, PRINCE and TWINE. I also introduce a new lightweight block cipher called SPARX which was designed using a new method to justify its security: the Long Trail Strategy. Part II is devoted to S-Box reverse-engineering, a field of study investigating the methods recovering the hidden structure or the design criteria used to build an S-Box. I co-invented several such methods: a statistical analysis of the differential and linear properties which was applied successfully to the S-Box of the NSA block cipher Skipjack, a structural attack against Feistel networks called the yoyo game and the TU-decomposition. This last technique allowed us to decompose the S-Box of the last Russian standard block cipher and hash function as well as the only known solution to the APN problem, a long-standing open question in mathematics. Finally, Part III presents a unifying view of several fields of symmetric cryptography by interpreting them as purposefully hard. Indeed, several cryptographic algorithms are designed so as to maximize the code size, RAM consumption or time taken by their implementations. By providing a unique framework describing all such design goals, we could design modes of operations for building any symmetric primitive with any form of hardness by combining secure cryptographic building blocks with simple functions with the desired form of hardness called plugs. Alex Biryukov and I also showed that it is possible to build plugs with an asymmetric hardness whereby the knowledge of a secret key allows the privileged user to bypass the hardness of the primitive. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 2130 (56 UL) Cryptic Architectures. Joel and Ethan Coen’s Cinematic Reception of E.A. Poe’s Work and of its Adaptation by Jean Epstein : The Case of The Ladykillers. Trans. from the French by Nadia D’Amelio.Küpper, Achim ![]() in Grama (2011), 15 Detailed reference viewed: 178 (0 UL)![]() Crypto SantaRyan, Peter ![]() in The New Codebreakers - Essays Dedicated to David Kahn on the Occasion of His 85th Birthday (2016) Detailed reference viewed: 295 (16 UL) Crypto-catholiques en Angleterre - Crypto-protestants en Empire : traîtres ou passeurs ?Weis, Monique ![]() Scientific Conference (2012) Detailed reference viewed: 90 (0 UL) Les « crypto-catholiques » en Angleterre à l’époque moderne. Le « marranisme » est-il un concept transposable ?Weis, Monique ![]() in Schreiber, Jean-Philippe; Ehrendfreund, Jacques (Eds.) Les marranismes. De la religiosité cachée à la société ouverte (2014) Detailed reference viewed: 77 (0 UL) Crypto-wallets and the new EU AML package: where are the battle lines drawn?Pocher, Nadia ![]() E-print/Working paper (2021) In an effort to overcome the fragmentation stemming from the national transpositions of the existing EU framework to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), the European ... [more ▼] In an effort to overcome the fragmentation stemming from the national transpositions of the existing EU framework to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), the European Commission has recently put forward a comprehensive set of legislative proposals. While accounting for the most significant aspects of this “AML package”, this blogpost explores the endeavor to implement the so-called “crypto travel rule” and the relevant impact on different types of cryptocurrency wallets. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 117 (0 UL) Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain TechnologyBiryukov, Alex ; in Data Privacy Management, Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology - ESORICS 2019 International Workshops (2019, September) Detailed reference viewed: 192 (3 UL) Cryptographic protocols for enforcing relationship-based access control policiesPang, Jun ; Zhang, Yang ![]() in Proceedings of the 39th Annual IEEE Computers, Software & Applications Conference (COMPSAC'15) (2015) Detailed reference viewed: 257 (9 UL) Cryptographic Schemes Based on the ASASA Structure: Black-box, White-box, and Public-keyBiryukov, Alex ; ; Khovratovich, Dmitry ![]() in 20th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security (2014, December) In this paper we pick up an old challenge to design public key or white-box constructions from symmetric cipher components. We design several encryption schemes based on the ASASA structure ranging from ... [more ▼] In this paper we pick up an old challenge to design public key or white-box constructions from symmetric cipher components. We design several encryption schemes based on the ASASA structure ranging from fast and generic symmetric ciphers to compact public key and white-box constructions based on generic affine transformations combined with specially designed low degree non-linear layers. While explaining our design process we show several instructive attacks on the weaker variants of our schemes. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 674 (11 UL)![]() Cryptographie à Clef Publique; Leprévost, Franck ; et alin Ebrahimi, Touradj; Leprévost, Franck; Warusfel, Bertrand (Eds.) Cryptographie et sécurité des systèmes et réseaux, 2 (2007) Les briques de construction des systèmes sécurisés d'information font appel aux notions de cryptologie, qui recouvre la cryptographie (la construction de cryptosystèmes) et la cryptanalyse (la recherche ... [more ▼] Les briques de construction des systèmes sécurisés d'information font appel aux notions de cryptologie, qui recouvre la cryptographie (la construction de cryptosystèmes) et la cryptanalyse (la recherche de failles dans les cryptosystèmes). Les cryptosystèmes reposent sur le principe de Kerckhoff, qui affirme que la sécurité d'un cryptosystème ne doit pas reposer sur l'ignorance de l'algorithme pour sa mise en œuvre, mais sur l'ignorance que l'attaquant a d'une information secrète. Ce volume, organisé en chapitres indépendants, traite de la cryptographie à clef secrète, en particulier de l'AES, et des méthodes de cryptanalyse linéaire et différentielle , de la cryptographie à clef publique, en particulier de RSA, du protocole d'échange de clefs de Diffie-Hellman, et des signatures électroniques. Il assemble ces briques de construction dans le cadre des architectures à clef publique (X.509, PGP, DNSSEC) et traite de la sécurité des systèmes (essentiellement Unix), et des réseaux. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 322 (1 UL) Cryptographie et lutte contre le terrorisme : éviter les fausses solutions sécuritaires; Leprévost, Franck ![]() in Droit et Défense (2002) Detailed reference viewed: 321 (0 UL) |
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