Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences; ; Piaser, Gwenaël et alin Mathematical Social Sciences (2008), 56(1), 75-95 This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is ... [more ▼] This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold when finite games with generic payoffs are considered. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals’ payoffs. This provides a rationale for the restriction to direct mechanisms even when competition among principals is considered. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 220 (0 UL) When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation; Piaser, Gwenaël ![]() in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2007), 9(4), 589-606 We introduce labor contracts in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms ... [more ▼] We introduce labor contracts in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms have perfect information, i.e., they perfectly discriminate against workers and take all the surplus, the best tax function is flat. If firms have imperfect information, i.e., if they offer incentive contracts, then (under some assumptions) the best redistributive taxation is regressive. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 173 (2 UL) Relative Performance Evaluation, Risk Aversion and EntryGuigou, Jean-Daniel ; ; Piaser, Gwenaël ![]() E-print/Working paper (2007) Detailed reference viewed: 289 (0 UL) |
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