Tax havens compliance with international standards: a temporal perspectiveZanaj, Skerdilajda ; Pieretti, Patrice ; E-print/Working paper (2016) Detailed reference viewed: 311 (2 UL) (Un)stable vertical collusive agreementsZanaj, Skerdilajda ; in Canadian Journal of Economics (2015) Detailed reference viewed: 381 (10 UL) Migration, wages and income taxesZanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in International Tax and Public Finance (2015) Detailed reference viewed: 236 (27 UL) The Cultural Transmission of Environmental Preferences: Evidence from International MigrationLitina, Anastasia ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ; Scientific Conference (2014, July 15) This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this ... [more ▼] This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this component, we exploit variation associated with international migration flows. We find that the environmental attitudes of migrants, while being resilient to environmental conditions, also embed a cultural component, which persists till the second generation migrants. Our results suggest that, in the presence of multiple environmental problems that require collective action, comprehending the driving forces behind the formation of an environmental culture is critical to design effective policies. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 124 (8 UL) The Cultural Transmission of Environmental Preferences: Evidence from International MigrationLitina, Anastasia ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ; Scientific Conference (2014, June 30) This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this ... [more ▼] This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this component, we exploit variation associated with international migration flows. We find that the environmental attitudes of migrants, while being resilient to environmental conditions, also embed a cultural component, which persists till the second generation migrants. Our results suggest that, in the presence of multiple environmental problems that require collective action, comprehending the driving forces behind the formation of an environmental culture is critical to design effective policies. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 92 (8 UL) Migration: a burden or a blessing for the natives; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() E-print/Working paper (2014) Detailed reference viewed: 103 (6 UL) Commodity taxation and regulatory competition; Picard, Pierre M ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() Presentation (2014, January) This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods ... [more ▼] This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no strategic interaction in commodity taxes; (ii) regulation leads to lower commodity tax rates if demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than demand for private goods and (iii) regulation policy is a strategically complement instrument if consumers do not over value product diversity. In the empirical part of the paper, we test our predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1990-2008. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 129 (20 UL) Offshore financial centres and bank secrecyZanaj, Skerdilajda ; Pieretti, Patrice ; E-print/Working paper (2014) Detailed reference viewed: 138 (6 UL) Asymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach; Pieretti, Patrice ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda et alin Journal of Public Economics (2014) This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential ... [more ▼] This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision-making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public services. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public services and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 424 (26 UL) The cultural transmission of Environmental preferences: Evidence from International MigrationZanaj, Skerdilajda ; Litina, Anastasia ; E-print/Working paper (2014) Detailed reference viewed: 76 (6 UL) Carbon tax, pollution and firms' location; ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() Presentation (2013, October) Detailed reference viewed: 103 (4 UL) Mergers in Fiscal Federalism; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in Journal of Public Economics (2013), 105 Detailed reference viewed: 310 (126 UL) Commodity taxation and regulatory competitionPicard, Pierre M. ; ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() Presentation (2013, July) Detailed reference viewed: 92 (8 UL) Market Games in Successive OligopoliesZanaj, Skerdilajda ; ; et alin Journal of Public Economic Theory (2013), 15(3), 397-410 Detailed reference viewed: 283 (122 UL) (Un)stable vertical collusive agreementsZanaj, Skerdilajda ; Presentation (2013, May) Detailed reference viewed: 186 (2 UL) Commodity taxation and regulatory competitionPicard, Pierre M. ; ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() Presentation (2013, March) Detailed reference viewed: 96 (4 UL) Commodity taxation and regulatory competitionPicard, Pierre M. ; ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() Presentation (2013, February 28) Detailed reference viewed: 76 (1 UL) Commodity taxation and regulatory competitionPicard, Pierre M. ; ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() Presentation (2013, February 14) Detailed reference viewed: 62 (1 UL) Offshore financial centers: Tax havens or safe havens; Pieretti, Patrice ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() E-print/Working paper (2013) Detailed reference viewed: 388 (3 UL) From tax evasion to tax planningBourgain, Arnaud ; Pieretti, Patrice ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() Scientific Conference (2013) This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated tax planning. Two ... [more ▼] This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated tax planning. Two alternative regimes are considered. A first, in which there is strict bank secrecy and a second, where there is international information exchange for tax purposes. In particular, we show that sharing tax information with onshore countries can be a dominant strategy for an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax planning. Moreover, a partial reduction of tax liabilities can already prompt OFCs to voluntarily exchange relevant tax information. We also discuss the conditions under which the possible removal of bank secrecy may reduce or increase the onshore country's tax revenue. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 146 (8 UL) |
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