![]() Beine, Michel ![]() in World Bank Economic Review (2007), 21(2), 249-254 In this paper, we provide alternative measures of the brain drain by defining skilled immigrants as those arrived in the receiving country after age 12, 18 or 22. We use data on age of entry collected in ... [more ▼] In this paper, we provide alternative measures of the brain drain by defining skilled immigrants as those arrived in the receiving country after age 12, 18 or 22. We use data on age of entry collected in a sample of OECD countries and then estimate the age-of-entry structure in the remaining host countries. The corrected brain drain rates are obviously below the global rates calculated in Docquier and Marfouk (2006). 1 [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 159 (4 UL)![]() Beine, Michel ![]() in Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles (2007), 49(1), 5-36 This paper explores the effects of the recent interventions of the Bank of Japan on the level and volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate. A special attention is devoted to the prominent features ... [more ▼] This paper explores the effects of the recent interventions of the Bank of Japan on the level and volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate. A special attention is devoted to the prominent features affecting the signal conveyed by these interventions. The results show a clear duality: small unilateral interventions are counterproductive while large and isolated ones influence the FX market in the desired directions. It is also found that the perverse effect is avoided through coordinated operations. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 134 (0 UL)![]() Beine, Michel ![]() in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money (2006), 17(3), 291-306 This paper empirically investigates the main determinants of secret interventions in the foreign exchange (FX) market. Using the recent experience of the Bank of Japan, we estimate a model that explains ... [more ▼] This paper empirically investigates the main determinants of secret interventions in the foreign exchange (FX) market. Using the recent experience of the Bank of Japan, we estimate a model that explains the share of secret to reported interventions in the FX market. Two sets of determinants are clearly identified: the first is related to the probability of detection of the central bank orders by market participants; the second to the central bank’s internal decision to opt for secrecy. Our estimations support the arguments of current microstructure theories that rationalize the use of secret interventions. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 84 (2 UL) |
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