Curriculum history or the educational construction of Europe in the long nineteenth century

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Abstract
Although it is generally acknowledged that the building of mass schooling systems must be considered in close relation to the emerging nation-states of the long 19th century, few published studies discuss the interrelation between the actual foundation of the (nation-) states and the introduction of the modern school. This article examines the role that constitutions play in the construction of national citizens as an expression of a particular cultural understanding of a political entity, and then discusses European examples, indicating how the particular constitutional construction of the citizens of European countries almost immediately triggered the need to create new school laws designed to organize the actual implementation of the constitutionally created citizens. The focus is on the specific need to ‘make’ loyal citizens by creating the symbiosis between the nation and the constitutional state and by emphasizing the cultural differences between the individual nation-states and their overall curricula. The article concludes with a formulation of research desiderata which envision a transnational curriculum history that is emancipated from both national and global research agendas, enabling a European education history that respects cultural distinctions rather than levelling them into one grand narrative.

Keywords
Curriculum, curriculum history, constitutions, Europe, long 19th century, loyal citizens, mass school system, nation-state, national citizens, transnational research agenda

Introduction
Today, education is increasingly discussed on a transnational level – for example, the European Union and European attempts to harmonize education policy (see, for instance, Lawn and Lingard, 2002; Sivesind et al., 2012). The difficulties that these political attempts encounter and which are discussed may well relate to the fact that despite the transnational policy approach that they
represent, and its idiosyncratic rhetoric, the national education systems still bear often invisible elements of national identity that have not vanished. This can be seen, for instance, in the political reactions to the immigration crises in 2015/2016. This seems to be true in particular in the field of education, both today and a long time ago: over 100 years ago, one of the first comparatists in education, the British historian Michael Sadler, noted: ‘A national system of education is a living thing, the outcome of forgotten struggles and difficulties and “of battles long ago”. It has in it some of the secret workings of national life’ (Sadler, 1900: 11). It seems that these ‘secret workings of national life’ still exist, and they deserve to be reconstructed in their origins and effects.

This article is therefore based on the premise of the desirability of a European education history that respects its diversity, and suggests that such an undertaking is possible if this European education history focuses on the means provided by curriculum history or, more precisely, by a particular form of curriculum history that is being developed in this paper. The emphasis on a particular form of curriculum history relates to the fact that curriculum history as an academic field did not emerge in a vacuum and may still bear the motives that once led to its emergence. The genre ‘curriculum history’ at first presupposed an institutional environment at universities or colleges, as a rule in departments of Curriculum and Instruction (or the like), which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in the context of teacher education at universities in the United States. These departments were established as a consequence of what was then called curriculum construction, or curriculum studies, and the obvious quest for curriculum theory which has boomed since the 1920s and 1930s as a reaction to mass immigration, and to which the authorities reacted with curriculum reform that was meant to enhance democracy.

The education research focus on curriculum highlights a fundamental difference between the United States and the European discussion on education and schooling. In Europe the discussion focused primarily on school-subject didactics (Gundem, 2000; Autio, 2006) and in Germany in addition on general didactics, referring to the idea of Bildung (Horlacher and De Vincenti, 2013). This makes an international comparative discussion on curriculum difficult (Hopmann and Riquarts, 1995; Westbury et al., 2000; see also Pinar, 2011), even more so when considering that against the background of the culturally non-negotiable epitome of Bildung, questions of schooling and curriculum or course of studies in Germany have always had a difficult standing in the academic community (Horlacher, 2016).

Accordingly, in (continental) Europe a more or less continuous research tradition under the catchword ‘curriculum’ has never really existed, and even interest in relevant transatlantic research has been somewhat marginal. Thus curriculum as an academic field of research and study has to be regarded as being largely an offshoot of a particular US way of understanding the organization of schooling and instruction that emerged from the challenges of mass immigration, modernization in terms of commercialization of life and the growth of large cities, and then the experiences of the First World War. It was the time when the social sciences were established at the modern research universities to confront societal challenges; they developed programmes in Education for Citizenship in a Democracy (Woellner, 1923) and published books such as The American Citizen in response to the ‘growing demand for the more adequate teaching of morals in the schools, especially with reference to the making of good citizens’ (Dole, 1892: v). Accordingly, the schools started to implement ‘social studies’ in their curricula to reinforce civics and social responsibility as democratic desiderata (Lybarger, 1983).

Curriculum or curricula were understood as core public educational or instructional means to reinforce US citizenship, and in times of change and uncertainty curriculum studies dealt in an academic way with these public means to make them more effective or efficient. This explicit commitment to (the US interpretation of) democracy is still relevant, even in historical accounts, as can be found in the popular book by Tanner and Tanner (1990), History of the School Curriculum.
Curriculum history seems to have a practical character, given that it is intended to advise actual curriculum development and reform (Goodlad, 1966: 91; Bellack, 1969; Kridel, 1989).

In Europe similar endeavours to (re-)connect education to democratic citizenship are found only in exceptional cases, which creates a particular challenge when adapting curriculum history as a particular research mode to reconstruct historically the educational construction of Europe in the long 19th century. Without a shift within the US curriculum debate called the ‘reconceptualist movement’, with its attempt to ‘understand, not just implement or evaluate, the curriculum’ (Pinar, 1999: xiv), connecting to other parts of the world would have been difficult, whereby the quest to ‘understand’ was directed towards an understanding of a cultural construction that includes particular visions of the child, the (ideal) social order and the (ideal) citizens. Due in particular to its international focus, the ‘reconceptualist’ discussion was less engaged in advocating and more engaged in critical analysis of curriculum (Apple, 1979; Popkewitz, 1991, 2009, 2013; Popkewitz et al., 2001; Pinar, 2006, 2014; Tröhler et al., 2011). This current international analytical-critical movement in curriculum research serves as the frame of this article, which deals essentially with two major aspects: the historiographic challenge between the national and the global, and the two-part team of constitution and curriculum.

The article is organized in six sections. The first starts with defining the problems of this historiographic framing, the fact of ‘export’ (of curriculum history) and its epistemological pitfalls. The next two sections look at the role that constitutions play in the construction of citizens as an expression of particular cultural understandings, and then discuss examples indicating how the particular constitutional construction of the citizens of European countries almost immediately triggered the need to create new school laws designed to organize the actual redemption of the constitutionally created citizens. The next two sections then examine the specific need to create loyal citizens by creating symbiosis between the nation and the constitutional state, and emphasize the cultural differences between the individual nation-states and their curricula. Based on these five sections, the final section summarizes and formulates research desiderata which envision transnational curriculum history that is emancipated from both national and global research agendas and may serve as research agenda for a European education history.

**Epistemological pitfalls of curriculum history**

Analysing recent trends in curriculum research (and thus curriculum history), Pinar (2014) identified a process of internationalization. For epistemological reasons Pinar earlier attached great importance to interpreting this as an ‘international’ rather than a ‘global’ development (Pinar, 2013). The significant epistemological difference between the global and the international may be derived from the basic assumptions of a world culture and it indicated the emergence of an ‘international society’ or a ‘world polity’ (Meyer, 1980; Boli and Thomas, 1997). To make the emergence and existence of a largely homogenized or standardized global or world culture plausible, the researchers evidently relativized the traditional assumption according to which the school systems of the nation-states of 19th-century Europe on the one side, and today’s globally more and more isomorphic schools on the other side, are to a large extent incompatible. They therefore claimed that as a rule both the functionality and singularity of the national education systems of the 19th century are greatly overestimated. They identified myriad international similarities, despite the fact that the national education systems became institutionalized in the national societies based on national and even nationalistic agendas (Meyer and Ramirez, 2000; see also Ramirez and Boli, 1987).

Accordingly, it is suggested that due to ‘world forces’ acting behind the nation-states the developments of curricula ‘show surprising degrees of homogeneity around the world’ (Meyer,
and that ‘variance across national societies is less noticeable than most arguments would have had it’, so that we may speak of a ‘world curriculum’ of the ‘global village’, indicating the ‘relative unimportance of the national, so far as mass curricular outlines go’ (Meyer, 1992: 6). As a consequence, curriculum history could be written as one history with some – mostly irrelevant – variances (of the same). If this suggestion is not followed here, it is not because some of the striking similarities that this research group has brought to our attention do not deserve interest. The scepticism arises from the fact that the ‘sociological mind’ (Meyer, 1992: 13) of inquiry may be over-emphasized, contributing to grand narratives encompassing some 500 years of history and advocating globalization narratives much more than analysing historical developments around the globe.

This ‘sociological mind’ (Meyer, 1992: 13) not only constructs grand narratives but also refrains from using the notion of ‘society’ as a culturally biased term, respectively as a floating signifier (Meyer, 1992: 8). In contrast to Meyer, it is argued that ‘society’ in one country was (and is) not ‘society’ in another and, furthermore, respective societies shaped the meaning of public transportation (Dobbin, 1994), art (Wosk, 1992), technology (Nye, 1994) and society itself and, through that, its educational aspirations, theories and curricula (Tröhler, 2014). Curricula, then, are to be understood against the background of the respective perceptions of a just society, the respective ideal citizen(s) and the respective child as a learner, respectively as a becoming citizen, and may therefore not be reduced to the formality of the simple existence of school subjects, expressed in ‘simple curricular outlines, listing subjects of instruction, and usually indicating the number of periods per week or year to be devoted to them’ (Meyer, 1992: 4).

School subjects have at times included many elements that were later identified as ‘autonomous’ – such as reading, history and morals, and vice versa – and have been clustered together – for instance (recently) chemistry and physics or history and geography. School subjects are indeed not ‘monolithic entities but shifting amalgamations of sub-groups and traditions’, as Goodson (1982: 3) once noted. The relevant definition of a school subject as a school subject, its respective contents and its hierarchical position within all school subjects are expressions of particular cultural and alchemistic hopes and strategies, even in the case of mostly innocuous school subjects such as mathematics (Popkewitz, 2004), which transform children into valuable or loyal citizens in the frame or the cultural value system of the respective nation-states.

It seems that this cultural understanding was more common over 100 years ago. In The Making of Citizens: A Study in Comparative Education, Hughes (1902) compared schooling and curriculum in France, England, the United States and Germany and recalled that ‘the school is a political institution maintained by the State for the cultivation and propagation of national ideals’ and that therefore ‘every school is a machine deliberately contrived for the manufactures of citizens’ (Hughes, 1902: 4). Hughes stressed that ‘each nation has…the system best suited to its idiosyncrasies’ (Hughes, 1902: 12) and can therefore ‘only be understood when seen in its own setting’, since it expresses ‘its nation’s genius; it is characteristic of its people’; it is an ‘indigenous product’. Hence it ‘is impossible to measure comprehensively any system of national education in terms of another’ (Hughes, 1902: 387).

To understand curricula historically, Hughes continues, ‘these national idiosyncrasies will need to be very carefully estimated’ (Hughes, 1902: 11), and there is little reason to disagree with that. It is true, however, that on a formal level there is unmistakably an isomorphic tendency, but mainly because the nation-states had a constant concern and searched internationally for even better or more efficient means by which to transform their children into loyal citizens. When Horace Mann reported his impressions from his voyage to Europe in 1843 (Mann, 1844) and introduced some major elements of the Prussian education system while reforming the education system, he never intended that the United States should turn into an ultra-conservative Prussian-style kingdom.
lacking any political constitution and having a highly segregated school organization. Quite the
contrary – and the same applies to the French philosopher and cultural theorist Victor Cousin, who
expressed admiration in his report (Cousin, 1832) on the state of public instruction in Prussia in the
early 1830s. Both Mann and Cousin ‘read’ Prussia in the frame of their (different!) democratic
republicanism and interpreted organizational and curricular models as suitable in the service of
their respective cultural, social and political ideals.

It is here that the epistemologically motivated alternative to a global approach – the interna-
tional approach – needs to take a transnational stance, in order not to be misguided by a national(ist)
historiography that takes for granted the self-declared uniqueness (and primacy) of the proponents
of the respective nation-states. The cross-boundary approach is devoted to questions of ‘traveling
models’ and fashions in the course of the history. ‘Borrowing’ was done quite unscrupulously, but
it never meant simply copying but, rather, translating into its own idiosyncrasy. As Harry Thiselton
Mark said in 1913,

‘American citizen’ is America’s watchword. In that name a Western civilization has to be built up. Our
elementary schools might well borrow the suggestion and do more to foster and make intelligent the fine
ideal of British citizenship. (Mark, 1913: 44)

Mark had no doubts that a British citizen was not identical to an American citizen. Not every-
thing that was admired was to be adopted, if it was not ‘translatable’ into one’s own ideological
‘language’, as Hughes pointed out:

The discipline of the German school is admirable, so is the general system of training – for German
children; yet there can be no doubt that such a system would be the very worst for English or American
children’. (Hughes, 1902: 11)

To understand the cultural framing of the curricula and the international and transnational
movements in the development of them it is essential to refer to the very basis of curricula: namely,
the school laws which, as a rule, were passed after the adoption of new constitutions. This is no
coincidence, as the next two sections will show. The first section below describes how constitu-
tions both express and sanction the very normative base of modern citizens, which entails the need
for mass education and therefore for curricula, providing ‘educational opportunities’ – that is, pre-
organized pathways of educational careers, structured in school subjects and their (selected)
knowledge, grades and tracks, whereby particular transition regimes decide on promotion from
grade to grade (repetition), access to one of the different school tracks or to further education at the
tertiary education level (or, alternatively, to vocational training). In contrast to some foci in curricu-
lum history, the emphasis is less on what students learn at school and more on what kind of a per-
son a student is meant to become while passing through (the original meaning of currere, the
infinitive form of curriculum; see Pinar, 2012: 43) pathways of educational careers. The section
after that presents several European cases which illustrate how, in general, new school laws fol-
lowed upon new constitutions: clearly, the creation of citizens via a constitution needed implemen-
tation or redemption.

Constitutions and the creation of citizens

Although it is generally acknowledged that the construction of the mass schooling systems has to
be seen in close relation to the emerging nation-states of the (very late) 18th century and mainly the
19th century, very few published studies discuss the interrelation between the foundation of the
(nation-) states and the establishment of modern schools. This is striking, because constitutional historians would have no doubts about the outstanding importance of the constitutions, which started to be implemented after American independence as sets of fundamental principles according to which states should be governed. Constitutions are expressions of sovereignty, be it in the hand of one, a few, or a people, which in turn can be created by the very act of the adoption of a constitution, as we find in exemplary manner in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States ratified in 1787: ‘We, the people of the United States’. Constitutions define and unite residents into a people and, through that, identify at the same time foreigners as different from native-born inhabitants, specify the rights and duties of the inhabitants (which may not be the same for all of them), arrange the basis of political interaction and participation, and define the relationship between the political and the religious. In short, constitutions express the dominant views of the ideal citizen, respectively the ideal citizens, of a given (ideal) political entity, and they ‘contain institutionalized mechanisms of power control for the protection of the interests and liberties of the citizenry’ (Gordon, 1999: 4).

Ideal, respectively constitutionally defined citizens are not born but made. One of the major elements in this ‘making of citizens’ has been compulsory schooling, interpreted as the ‘pedagogic machine that operates not only to impart knowledge but to instruct in conduct and to supervise, evaluate and rectify childhood pathologies’ (Rose, 1989: 122). Thus constitutions and school laws (and hence curricula) have a threefold relationship. On a very formal level, there is a clear hierarchy, because a school law in any event has to follow the fundamental guidelines defined in the constitution. On a more content level, the constitution and school laws/curricula are like specifica-
tion and implementation: namely, the definition and the making of the ideal citizen; but on a more cultural level they are organizational brothers in arms for traditionally culturally-embedded beliefs and values, at least for dominant parts of the respective societies. This shared cultural background is important for understanding that the ‘political elites’ did not simply invent a new social order at will and from scratch but had to ‘construct their ideologies in such a way that they resonate with the public, which partly depends on their ability to connect, in a meaningful way, to pre-existing cultural and moral frameworks’ (Zimmer, 2003: 5). In other words, ‘people do invent traditions, but not in circumstances of their own choosing’ (Zimmer, 2003: 8).

Curricula reflect – as do constitutions – fundamental, taken-for-granted ‘cultural–cognitive’ (Scott, 2001: 57) assumptions about the respective ideals of the ‘good life’ and the just social order made up by ideal citizens, as Hughes indicated as early as in 1902, when he correlated – supposedly analytically – democracy and the end of classical languages in the curriculum: ‘Democracy is impossible in a school where the classics reign supreme’ (Hughes, 1902: 390). The rejection of classical ‘dead’ languages in the context of democratic-republican states has a long tradition and can be identified in Benjamin Rush’s writings on the mode of education proper in a republic (Rush, 1786/1965) or in Thomas Paine’s (1794) The Age of Reason:

As there is now nothing new to be learned from the dead languages, all the useful books, being already translated, the languages are become useless, and the time expended in teaching and in learning them is wasted. (Paine, 1794/1989: 296)

Even if we are tempted by democratic confessions, a normative point of view is not an ideal starting point for a historical analysis of curricula, not least because, first, at least until the First World War, most of the nation-states had very limited forms of democracy and, second, very different forms of democracy exist(ed). The type and degree of democracy is defined by the constitutions, whereby constitutions are not simply concerned with defining either more or fewer rights for their citizens: they differ not merely in terms of the *material* aspects of constitutions – that is,
decisions about the form of government, division of powers, participation of the people in the legislative, executive, and judicial systems, and of the range of further individual liberties. Beyond the material aspects of the constitution, there is a formal dimension which characterizes the constitution as a constitution – that is, its ‘location’ within the legal system as a whole: it makes a fundamental difference whether or not the constitution has absolute priority over the laws, as has been the case in the United States since the Supreme Court case Marbury v. Madison (1803); or whether the laws passed by parliament are almost equivalent to the constitution, as in the case of France; or whether a constitution does not exist at all and the tradition of court decisions takes the place of constitutions, as in the United Kingdom. Given, in addition, that the Constitution of the United States is fundamentally federal, whereas the Constitution of France is largely central, the relation between the ‘free citizens’ and the two republics could hardly be more different. The US citizen is locally defined, with legal certainty provided by the Constitution, protected from an excess of state power by the system of checks and balances; the French citizen is a centrally defined citizen with legal certainty in the laws adopted by the parliament as the epitome of French Republicanism.

This in turn explains why no federal law in the United States regulates any educational policy directly, and why laypersons, as members of the local school boards, control the school to a large degree; whereas, in contrast, education policy in France is almost completely governed by central experts, often trained in the highly elitist Écoles normale supérieure. This explains how the notion of citizen – as is also the case with ‘society’ – may only be used as a generic term or floating signifier: a French citoyen is not a US citizen, a US citizen is not a British citizen, a British citizen is not a German Bürger, and a German Bürger is not a Swiss Bürger, despite the fact that France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland are all constitutional democracies and that any dictionary in the world would translate citoyen as citizen or Bürger. I will make this thesis plausible by giving some selected European examples that indicate all three levels of the interrelation between constitution and curriculum: the close cultural relation, the substantive relationship, and the formal hierarchy.

**New constitutions and new school laws: European examples**

Whether or not the nation-states’ new constitutions were liberal, heading towards a secular and even democratic republic, or conservative, protecting the nobility, monarchy, the church or a combination of them, and whether or not the constitutions had articles concerning education, almost every time a constitution tried to (re-)formulate a new social ideal for the (nation-) state, a new school law followed as a rule within five years. The most striking and unmatched example is France. The first French Constitution was adopted in 1791, and Condorcet presented his new school law to the parliament in April 1792. Due to the political turmoil, the French constitution was altered in June 1793, and a new school law was adopted in November 1794; and when the French again adopted a new constitution in August 1795, the new school law (known as the Daunou law) was adopted in October 1795. The next constitution followed in December 1799, and the new school law followed in May 1802. After the end of Napoleon Bonaparte’s reign, the French Charter (equivalent to a constitution) was adopted in 1814, bringing the House of Bourbon back to power, and a new school order (ordonnance) was passed in February 1816 (and another in 1820). When in 1830 the July Revolution limited the Bourbon regime, expressed by the constitution in 1830, the new school law (called the Guizot law) followed in 1833.

That’s not all. The February Revolution in 1848 established the Second Republic, based on France’s new constitution adopted in November 1848, and the new school law (the Falloux law) was passed in March 1850. Two years later, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte declared himself Emperor Napoleon III (after he was President of the Republic), decreed a new constitution in January 1852,
and issued as a decree the new school law on 9 March 1852, which was passed by parliament in June 1854. When Louis Napoleon Bonaparte expanded his power dramatically between 1866 and 1869 by quasi-constitutional acts, a new school law followed in April 1867, and after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) new constitutional laws followed in 1875, followed by the two important Jules Ferry laws in 1881 (making schools free of charge) and in 1882 (making schools mandatory and secular).

France is an exceptional example, of course, and not all European countries followed this pattern, in particular not those countries that were more or less forced by historical events to draft constitutions rather than to create (or legitimate) new social ideas and power structures, such as some of the Nordic States. Denmark – loyal to Napoleon and thus defeated in 1814 – adopted a new school law in the year 1814, with no new constitution until 1849,⁵ the result of a national movement emerging in the 1830s.⁶ How much the feeling of liberation affected the interrelation of constitution and school law may be seen in Finland where, after centuries of being occupied by Sweden (1249–1809) and then by Russia (1809–1917), the Finns adopted a constitution in July 1919 and passed a school law in 1921.

In the immediate context of Napoleon Bonaparte there were even closer relations between the emergence of a new constitution and a new school law and curriculum. The French gave the Batavian Republic its constitution in 1797; a new school law was passed in 1801, followed by the laws of 1803 and 1806, the latter being the foundation of the development of not only the Dutch nation-state. The Helvetic Republic introduced its constitution in 1798, and its school law came into force in 1799 (influenced by the plan that Condorcet had presented to the French parliament in 1792). These two revolutionary case studies reveal the interconnection between new social and political ideas and the education of the future citizen, as does the instance of Belgium, which separated from the Netherlands in 1830 and passed a new constitution in 1831, followed by a draft of a comprehensive school law in the same year (Commission spéciale, 1832), which, however, seems not to have been passed until 1842. Meanwhile, in 1839, today’s Luxembourg, originally a part of segregationist Belgium in 1830, became independent and gave itself a constitution in 1841 and a new school law in 1842, whereby the hidden, sometimes amazing and surprising borrowings connected the school laws of France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, without depriving them of their peculiarity (Thyssen, 2013). The same dependence on a new constitution and a new school law occurred in federal countries such as Switzerland. Zurich adopted a new constitution in 1830, and the new school law followed in 1832; Bern adopted its new constitution in 1831, and the new school law followed in 1833.

This most striking two-part team of constitution and school law/curriculum, providing the structured educational opportunities, can be found in almost all other European nation-states, including Spain. With the effective occupation of Spain by the Napoleonic troops in 1807/08,⁷ Spanish national sentiment became overwhelming, praising the Spanish nation as a unity and its citizens as enemies of the French. This sentiment found expression, for instance, in an extremely popular publication of 1808, Civil Catechism, and brief summary of the obligations of the Spanish, useful knowledge of their freedom, and the explanation of its enemy, very useful in the present circumstances, as a dialogue,⁸ which some years later was translated into German by the Prussian poet Heinrich von Kleist to fuel German anti-French sentiments: it was published in 1813 as Catechism of the Germans (Katechismus der Deutschen) (Schulze, 1994: 191) and republished in 1926, 1939 and 1940. To challenge the constitution of 6 July 1808 imposed by Napoleon, stakeholders in the free part of Spain – the very south of the country – organized the first national sovereign assembly in Cadiz and adopted the Spanish Constitution of 1812. The constitution never came fully into effect, in fact, but it triggered educational reforms: in 1813 the poet and politician Manuel José Quintana prepared a report known as the Quintana report (Quintana, 1813/2013), which was
subsequently signed into law. When a version of a constitutional monarchy was established in 1834, a new school plan – *Plan general de Instrucción Pública* drafted by Duque de Rivas in 1836 – followed almost immediately. Furthermore, when in 1845 a ‘real’ constitution was adopted, which defined in its first article who ‘the Spanish are’, the next educational reform law, *Plan General de estudios*, by Pedro José Pidal, was passed in the same year.

In Austria, matters were somewhat different. During the Austro–Prussian War in 1866 Austria lost its supremacy in the German confederation to Prussia; a year later, in December 1867, it gave itself a constitution defining Austria as a constitutional monarchy – although the emperor was still defined as ‘by Grace of God’ – and less than 18 months later, in May 1869, the *Reichsvolkschulgesetz* [school law] was passed, organizing the entire school system anew. These Austrian developments were also affected by developments in Italy, because Italy started to unite in 1859 by liberating Lombardy from Austria and proclaiming itself as the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, finding its lasting form in 1871; it adopted the 1848 constitution (*Statuto Albertino*) of Piedmont–Sardinia. The *Statuto Albertino* remained the basis of the new Kingdom’s legal system after Italian unification was achieved, and the Kingdom of Sardinia became the Kingdom of Italy in 1861. In Piedmont–Sardinia the first school law had been issued in 1848 (*Bon Compagni*), a revision was issued in 1859 (*Cabro Casati*, largely following the French law) (Casati, 1859), and six years after the new Kingdom of Italy had found its definite form a comprehensive Italian school law was adopted in 1877 (*Legge Coppino*). Here, Italy was even later than England: England introduced the Elementary Education Act in 1870 as a fundamental framework for the schooling of all children between the ages of 5 and 13 in England and Wales. It should be noted that England, to the present day, has never had a constitution in the modern sense because it bases its social order on what is called common law, developed by judges through the decisions of courts and equivalent tribunals.

The example of Spain described above makes particularly clear how the idea of the nation, the implementation of a national sentiment, was an important factor in the implementation of the twocolumned programme in making citizens (constitution and curriculum): the nation became the quasi-sacred expression of the cultural tradition, uniting people and turning citizens into loyal citizens of a particular social order. However, the cultural differences between the different nation-states were striking.

The next section will engage first with the actual need to invent the idea of the nation as creating identity beyond both inalienable natural freedom and commitment to the region, and the section following that will indicate how this national agenda was translated into curricula.

**The political invention of the nation-state and the creation of the loyal citizen**

The first two modern constitutions creating modern citizens – the Constitution of the United States ratified in 1788, and the *Constitution française* ratified in 1791 – were pioneering for the 19th century and the establishment of the European nation-states that did not exist before that time. Irrespective of how different these two constitutions were, and how different their destinies were to be (the Constitution of the United States still exists today, supplemented – and altered – by amendments; the *Constitution française* did not even survive two years), they both operate in a similar way by defining the idea of the nation as ‘ties that bind’ and thus the need for the creation of the loyal citizen. Both constitutions build on declared ideas of universal and inalienable human rights.9

The strategy of building a new political order (constitution) by first setting every human free in principle (human rights) creates the problem of to how to ‘convince’ these ‘free’ beings within a state to be loyal to its constitution and laws. This problem had been familiar to Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, who added a chapter on ‘Civil Religion’ at the very end of *The Social Contract* because, as he argued,

…it is very important for the State that every citizen should have a religion which may make him delight in his duties...a purely civil profession of faith...without which it is impossible to be a good citizen. (Rousseau, 1762/2002: 252)

It is comparatively easy to unite people against a regime that is understood as unjust – for instance the British and the French monarchies – by declaring all people free by nature (and, that is, by principle), but it is much more difficult to make them into *loyal* or *good citizens* of the new constitutional state (and, for instance, not only of the region). It had been intellectuals who proclaimed people as free by nature based on theories of natural rights, and it was intellectuals again, often poets, who somehow reunited the people as citizens in the imagined community (Anderson, 1983) of the nation by uniting the ideas of nation and the constitutional state.

The idea – or at least the concept – of the nation is old, but it became a powerful politically explosive force only in combination with the constitutional states. In the United States this combination of the constitutional state and the nation may already be detected in the Constitution, but it became much more evident when the United States – as did most of the European states – gained its national(ist) momentum after Napoleon’s reign – that is, in the ‘Era of Good Feelings’ (Dangerfield, 1965) followed by an ‘Era of Reforms’ between 1830 and 1860, when a modern mass schooling system was implemented in most parts of the United States (Green, 1990). France was the exception, because the constitution was understood to be an expression of the always existing nation, which, according to Abbé Sièyes (1789/2002: 2), was essentially the Third Estate. Accordingly, in the *Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen* (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, passed by France’s National Constituent Assembly in August 1789), all sovereignty is said to reside in the nation, protecting human and citizens’ rights (Article 3). The *Constitution française* in 1792 defined French citizenship formally as birthright citizenship and defined the exceptions (Title II, Article 2). However, the stakeholders deemed this formal definition of a French citizen inadequate, because every French citizen was required in a Rousseau-like manner to express their ‘civil profession of faith’ by swearing a citizen’s oath:

I swear to be faithful to the nation, to the law, and to the King, and to maintain with all my power the Constitution of the kingdom, decreed by the National Constituent Assembly in the years 1789, 1790, and 1791. (Title II, Article 5)

In contrast, the German states before 1871, even those that adopted constitutions of their own, were not nation-states. Only after the Franco–Prussian War (1870–1871), during which the North German Confederation and the South German states united to become the German empire as a nation-state under the King of Prussia, was a German constitution adopted, in 1871, characterizing the German empire as a nation-state. After having defeated France, it also included four formerly French departments (*départements français*), now called the *Imperial Territory of Alsace-Lorraine*. The inhabitants of this territory, who had in the course of the 19th century learned to be foremost French citizens, not least by the expansion of formal schooling (Weber, 1976) now had to learn that they were, in fact, Germans, only to be taught again after 1918 that this was not the case, that they were actually French, at least until 1940 and then after 1945, and in between, during World War 2, they were Germans once more. *Learning to Be Loyal* (Harp, 1998) had been a constant back and forth for the people of this region, and primary schooling served to a significant extent the ever-changing loyalties of the citizens by changing
the curricula – not so much the school subjects as formal teaching units but the content and also
the administration of schooling, including teacher education.

The nation had become both the guidance and point of hope, even a secular vision of redemption
of a meanwhile almost entirely educationalized Western culture, emerging around 1800. By
the late 19th century this educationalized culture assigned almost any perceived social problems or
challenges to education, and this served as the basis for the massive expansion and increasing dif-
ferentiation of the school system (Tröhler, 2013). In 1882, stimulated by the question of the nation-
ality of people living in the Imperial Territory of Alsace-Lorraine, the French intellectual Ernest
Renan tried to answer the question of what the nation is. Renan (1882) considered all the defini-
tions that he knew – common race, common language, common religion and common interests –
and rejected all of them, to conclude that a nation is something spiritual behind its appearances:

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly speaking, are really one and the same
constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present. One is the possession
in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present consent, the desire to live together. (Renan,
1882: 28)

Indeed, most of the definitions of the nation in use in Europe were transcendent and sacred, but
besides that they emphasized either commonality of language, race, religion, history or interests,
which all found expression in the school curricula. This becomes clear, for instance, in the curricu-
lum of 19th century France, where history, geography, music and even physical education were
rarely taught, in contrast to Germany where national self-assurance had to include the sense of
Germany’s heroic historical past, knowledge about the different German states, a feeling of togeth-
erness through community singing (of either religious or national songs) and physical strength as
the basis for future soldiers (Harp, 1998: 60). France, in contrast, limited itself mainly to the Three
Rs, religion, and – against the background of France’s actual multilingualism – the French lan-
guage. In the course of the 19th century, the conviction grew, to the extent of perfect certainty, that
‘one could not really be French without speaking French’ (Harp, 1998: 33).

It is these differences made evident by the examples of France and Germany that also make the
notion of the ‘nation’ – like the notion of ‘society’ and ‘citizen’ – a generic term. ‘Nation’ bundles
the culture-specific or idiosyncratic content into the formal definition that Renan provided: ‘A
great aggregation of men, in sane mind and warm heart, created a moral conscience that calls itself
a nation’ (Renan, 1882: 31). To construct this ‘moral conscience’ that ‘calls itself a nation’ in the
‘aggregation of men’ in ‘sane mind and warm heart’ was the noble duty of the modern mass school-
ing system, as the following section, indicating how the national agendas were translated into their
respective curricula, will show.

**Cultural agendas and curricula**

The idea of the nation-state connected psychologically the constitutions and curricula in their aspi-
ration to make the desired loyal citizens. What was said in 1828 in Luxembourg was a general
belief throughout the Western world:

The primary schools are the cradle of the citizen. Therefore the youth has to be trained to the practice of
all the civic, moral, and religious virtues that a true citizen has to be accustomed to. (quoted in Witry, 1900:
34)

The triangulation of constitution–nation–curriculum in the making of the citizens may again sug-
gest a global narrative about the emergence of a largely homogenized or standardized global or world
culture. This linear and teleological view is idiosyncratic with regard to the agenda of institutions with globalized and hegemonic agendas like the OECD (Tröhler, 2010), but it hardly passes the test of historical inquiry. It made a great difference for real life in the respective social orders if a constitution was decreed from above in the ‘name of God Almighty’, describing the monarch as ‘by the grace of God’ and defining, in Article 1, the Catholic Church as fundamental (‘The Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Church, in Spain and in all Spanish possessions, will be the religion of the King and the nation, and not allow any other’) as in the Spanish Constitution of 1808, or if, 10 years previously, in 1798, Article 2 of the Helvetic Republic says: ‘The totality of the citizens is the sovereign’ and that freedom of religion is guaranteed (Article 6) and the ‘two pillars of the public good are security and the Enlightenment’, whereby the ‘Enlightenment is preferable to prosperity’ (Article 4).

These were not word games without relevance for daily life. They expressed dominant cultural convictions about the social and political order that were reflected in the curriculum and its idiosyncratic arrangement of school subjects and the selection of knowledge, the grades, the tracks and the transition regimes between them, preparing and providing social stratification via selection. To be a citizen could have completely different meanings, as can be seen in the definition of the political rights of the citizens, which defined the degree of participation in sovereignty: Italy in 1861 was a constitutional monarchy with a census suffrage, as most of the European constitutional nation-states had, and its actual suffrage in 1861 was around 3% of the population, and around 7% in 1882, whereas France and Switzerland had full male suffrage in 1848 (for resident male citizens) and the German Empire implemented full male suffrage in 1871. Full universal suffrage (including women) usually followed about 10 to 20 years after full male suffrage, whereby France followed only in 1945, Italy (men and women at the same time) in 1945, Belgium in 1948 and Switzerland in 1971.

Progressive school administration and innovative pedagogy were not always the twin brothers of a progressive or liberal constitution, as can be seen in Prussia, which had the most advanced educational administration, exemplary teacher education and Didaktik and, at the same time, a highly segregated school system. This tension was an integral component of the constitution decreed by the Prussian king in 1850. It provided religious freedom (Article 13), allowed civil marriage (Article 19), declared the principle of academic autonomy and freedom (Article 20), devoted five articles to public education (Articles 21–26), declared freedom of opinion and abolished censorship (Article 27), allowed unlimited right of assembly and the right of petition (Articles 29, 30, 32), and guaranteed the secrecy of correspondence (Article 33). In contrast, however, the constitution implemented a three-class franchise, according to which a chamber of the parliament was composed of one-third very rich citizens, representing some 4.7% of the population, one-third medium-rich citizens, representing some 12.6% of the population, and the last third representing over 82% of the population. Furthermore, the king alone was entitled to hold executive power (Article 45). The king appointed and dismissed all ministers, ordered the proclamation of laws and issued the decrees necessary for their execution (Article 45); and the king commanded the army (Article 46), whereby the army had regulations that could differ from the constitution: ‘A swearing-in of the army on the Constitution does not occur’ (Article 108).

The Prussian constitution stated that,

…all Prussians are equal before the law. Class privileges do not take place. The public offices are, in compliance with the conditions established in the laws, equally accessible for all able persons. (Article 4)

In truth, this was a kind of lip service: it was not completely wrong, but neither was it real. In the explanatory notes to the new school law in 1854 the author, Anton Wilhelm Ferdinand Stiehl, a Lutheran theologian and member of the privy council (Geheimrat), aiming to educate youth in Christian and Prussian-patriotic attitudes as well as domestic virtues, stated – with regard to
equality and concerning universal human education, and thus expressing the tension to be found in the constitution – that:

The idea of a universal human education through formal development of the mental faculties on abstract content has been found by experience to be ineffective or harmful. (…) Accordingly, the elementary school in which the majority of the people receive the basis if not the completion of their education must serve not an abstract system or a thought of science but practical life in church, family, work, community and state, and to prepare for this life … within its circles (Stiehl, 1854: 64)

Against this background, Stiehl (1854: 65) concluded that in elementary schooling for the masses four school subjects should be taught; namely, and first of all, Religion, the German Language (reading and writing), some Mathematics, and Singing. Given the very minor importance of mathematics, an average Prussian pupil had to become a hardworking, disciplined, and devoted German-speaking Christian Prussian. In particular, he (or she) had no Latin in school, although its mastery was required for transition to the Gymnasium (academic-track secondary school), which devoted far more than 40% of the teaching time to Latin and Greek (Herrlitz et al., 1993: 48). The Prussian school system therefore foresaw for wealthier parents a school run in parallel to the free elementary school, the fee-paying ’prep school’ (Vorschule) – ’prep school’ understood here as the preparation or preliminary stage leading to the Gymnasium – with the career gatekeeper Latin in the core of its syllabus. This highly socially segregated curricular order was abolished only during the otherwise unsuccessful school reform of the Weimar Republic in 1925. This curricular practice of segregation was by no means a Prussian peculiarity: it was found in most strictly hierarchical societies.10

The result of the German efforts was quite impressive, however, because in Prussia some 82% of an age cohort attended school (Dieterici, 1849: 47) whereas, in Italy, for instance, with a constitution (also imposed, by Charles Albert of Sardinia, in 1848) approximately as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ as the Prussian constitution, only some 40% went to school (Weber, 2010: 70). What was even more serious in Italy was that compulsory schooling lasted only two years, so that it is hardly possible to speak of ‘curriculum’ in the modern sense. In Prussia, at least as defined by the law, compulsory schooling lasted eight years. It is no wonder that the literacy rate in Italy was substantially lower than in Prussia; in 1861 only 25% of Italy’s inhabitants were literate. This Italian literacy rate was even lower than the worst regional rates in France: the illiteracy rate in middle and southern France in 1866 ranged from 55% to 65%, but was only from 5% to 10% in the northeastern regions bordering Germany and Switzerland (Furet and Ozouf, 1977: 201). Thus, as in other nation-states, too, Italy’s political unification became primarily an educational matter, but for distinct reasons, because learning the standardized language (which means Tuscan rather than the very different dialects) was seen as essential – but required people to be literate. Indeed, the fight against the dialects was a major driving force of the fight for literacy, with the aim of imposing a standardized Italian language for the sake of Italian unity (Lepschy and Lepschy, 1986: 21). For this reason, the Italian minister of education, Emilio Broglio, and others, published a four volume New Vocabulary of the Italian Language (Novo vocabolario della lingua italiana) between 1870 and 1897 for use in the schools (Broglio and Battista, 1870–1890).

Transnationalism and curriculum history: a theoretical framework for Europe

The making of citizens was achieved in places where schooling was poorly institutionalized in the same way as it was in places where schooling was highly institutionalized, because the very degree
of institutionalization represented largely what kind of (loyal) citizens a given culture felt it needed and intended to make. A statistically verified existence of simple school subjects – the basis of world culture theory – therefore gives both a distorted and an overgeneralized picture of curriculum history. At least as important as the formal existence of school subjects are school structures, grades, school tracks, regimes of control, transition regimes, stratification and exclusion mechanisms, the order of school subjects (in the syllabus and in the weekly timetable), and the selected and arranged contents in the curricular guidelines and in the textbooks or schoolbooks (for England, see Heathorn, 2000). Extra-curricular activities offered by the schools belong to the making of citizens, such as – foremost in the United States – athletic programmes, drama clubs and marching bands. Equally important are school uniforms (Dussel, 2001) or school rituals (McLaren, 1986) constituting ‘curriculum’ in its historical development, unifying people as a national ‘we’ and citizens, but at the same time stratifying them socially into different categories such as gender, class and talent, and distinguishing them from others. Curriculum is an amalgam, appearing as a whole, hardly revealing its ingredients and revealing not at all the previous processing of those ingredients. What may be a delicacy in one country may well be judged inedible in another.

Against this background, curriculum history needs to pay attention to previously somewhat marginalized items such as music (Gustafson, 2009), allegedly neutral mathematics (Diaz, 2014) or presumed harmless physical education – the latter representing in England part of the education of the gentleman, in Prussia part of the education of the strong, willing and executing soldier as subject, and in Switzerland part of the education of the militia’s citizen-soldier as a part of civic education. Besides these various individual school subjects, the hierarchy of the school subjects depicted in the timetables deserves special attention, beginning – for a very long time and almost without exception – with religion, followed by languages, mathematics, history and geography, and, invariably in last place, physical education and home economics for girls, reflecting the late implementation of women’s suffrage. The hierarchy is neither alphabetical nor does it follow the quantitative allocations of the weekly lessons, but it does express cultural values. Religion is of particular interest because it dominated the curricular hierarchy even long after religious education had in some places been declared voluntary.

The very fact of a politically and economically dominant global force and its inherent academic system with its particular system of reasoning is no licence to extrapolate national narratives to global ones. The exporting of a particular way to understand curriculum – suggesting a close relation to democratic citizenship – runs the risk of imposing this normative agenda on other nation-states rather than to refer back to the ideological background of this construction – the political philosophy of Reformed Protestantism – and to reconstruct from there the political philosophies reflecting fundamental values and beliefs as they are expressed in the constitutions, school laws and curricula.

The alleged global perception and agenda hide these origins, and it is in this concealment that the inevitable curse and mark of Cain of the national origin of curriculum studies and curriculum history carries the danger of globally extrapolating specific national connotations of ‘nation’, ‘society’ and ‘citizen’ to the world, rather than using them as floating signifiers. This globalization took place in particular in the case of the change in paradigm from input to output steering in educational policy, which made sense somehow only in the particular, parochial context of the United States but which has now been disseminated increasingly to other parts of the world, where this educational policy model would actually be unnecessary (Tröhler, 2011). The well-meant large-scale studies on citizenship education conducted in several European countries and Australia, where the results did not seem to correlate at all with the enormous effort in citizenship education, are a further example, leaving researchers like Hahn (1999) somewhat perplexed: ‘Whether they are rooted in culture, history, or some aspects of schooling is not evident’; the results appear to be some sort of a ‘combination of all those factors’, which cannot be operationalized by empirical
research. The problem, Hahn (1999: 231) concluded, is that what works in one political culture with its ‘distinct set of values’ cannot simply be adopted in another that has ‘differing traditions, values and meanings’. There is nothing more to contribute to this insight except to envisage what this means for research in the field of curriculum history and curriculum study.

The pitfalls are manifold and quite layered. The educational sciences are children of the educationalized cultures of the 19th century nation-states, and up to the present time they have not really emancipated themselves from these national(ist) ambitions. The national constraints can have two consequences: either they lead to often decontextualized but certainly non-comparative case studies of curriculum study, history or theory, or they follow the sacred imperial energy of the nation, promising global redemption by global standardization according to the patterns of the national agenda that are most dominant globally. Being culturally part of this national agenda makes it tempting to give this global redemptive aspiration legitimation by a history of its own, suggesting a rational structure in it, permitting no alternatives, or variances (of the same) at most. The grand narrative contains accidents and exceptions, but these are accidents and exceptions within the grand narrative. However, history, and especially ‘curriculum history’, lies somewhere in between the culturally decontextualized local case study and the grand narrative of an imperialized national culture (Tröhler and Lenz, 2015). It obviously profits substantially from being aware of legacies, from international-comparative scopes, and from transnational tracking, and through all that from being enabled to be analytical rather than unconsciously activist in some sense, national or imperial. Against this background, a European history of education, reconstructing a striking educationalized nation-building in its diversity and transnational flows, seems to be not only desirable but also possible; it does not promise a basis of a European standardization, but, rather, simply insights and clarification, and perhaps even enlightenment.

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1. I want to thank John Rudolph, Chair of Curriculum and Instruction, School of Education, University of Wisconsin-Madison, for this information.
2. For instance, Tyler’s (1949) Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction, first published in 1949, was translated into Norwegian only in 1971 and into German and Dutch in 1973; the 45th printing in 1989 seems to have been the last one in the United States, whereas the Norwegian edition was republished a second (and last) time in 1972, perhaps because Tyler’s unspoken background was the democratically controlled local community school with its autonomy in constructing its very own curriculum – a phenomenon almost completely unknown in Europe. In the same manner, none of the three editions of Kliebard’s (1986) The Struggle for the American Curriculum 1893–1958 have ever been received in Germany, and almost the same applies to Apple’s (1979; translated into Spanish in 1986) Ideology and Curriculum, or the classic Understanding Curriculum (Pinar et al, 1995).
3. Thomas Englund’s (1986) Curriculum as a Political Problem is, for Sweden, an exception, but in contrast to the American discussion (that Englund reflects), which focuses on the whole curriculum, Englund restricts himself to the school subject ‘citizenship education’.
4. To some degree, these material aspects of organizing social order are (at least as institutionalized practices) much older than the formal constitution itself, the written fundamental right and its relation to the different law books.
5. In an unpublished conference paper Christian Larsen (Larsen, 2015) indicated that the Danish school law of 1814 was in fact a ‘series of school laws’ for different children according to their social background, the region they lived in, their gender and religion. The unifying principle of the school laws was loyalty to the Danish king and not to the Danish nation-state, which at least partly explains the Danish exception.

6. The ‘reversed’ route happened in Sweden, which adopted a new constitution in 1809 after its defeat against Russia, losing Finland, and passed a school law only in 1842 after long debates about a school law (Boli, 1989: 214). Norway, however, was more ‘continental’ because it declared its independence immediately, after having lost – as an ally of Denmark – the Napoleonic War in 1814 by adopting a constitution immediately before it was invaded by the Swedes. In a compromise, the Norwegians accepted the Swedish king as ‘their’ king, and the Swedes accepted the comparatively liberal Norwegian constitution. In 1816, a provisional school law was accepted; it was passed officially in 1827, as the first comprehensive Norwegian school law was passed. For more details on the somewhat particular situation in Scandinavia, see Tröhler (in press).

7. Formally, it was permission for the French troops to pass through Spain to fight the British stationed in Portugal.

8. *Catecismo civil y breve compendio de las obligaciones del español, conocimiento práctico de su libertad y explicacion de su enemigo, muy útil en las actuales circunstancias, puesto en forma de diálogo.*

9. In the case of the United States the *Virginia Bill of Rights* (June 1776) and the Declaration of Independence (July 1776), and in the case of France the *Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen* (August 1789), which would later serve as the precursor of the first three French constitutions (1791, 1793, 1795).

10. Luxembourg, for instance, taught boys in the city of Luxembourg more French than it taught girls in the city and all children outside the city, because French was Luxembourg’s official administrative language, spoken by the urban elite, in a nation-state with a German dialect as the vernacular language (a Moselle Franconian dialect). To prevent parents outside the city from sending their sons to schools in Luxembourg-City, the local council introduced in December 1865 a school tax for all children whose parents did not live within the city limits (Schreiber, 2014: 126).

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