[en] We introduce the notion of privacy-preserving verifiability for security protocols. It holds when a protocol admits a verifiability test that does not reveal, to the verifier that runs it, more pieces of information about the protocol’s execution than those required to run the test. Our definition of privacy-preserving verifiability is general and applies to cryptographic protocols as well as to human security protocols. In this paper we exemplify it in the domain of e-exams. We prove that the notion is meaningful by studying an existing exam protocol that is verifiable but whose verifiability tests are not privacy-preserving. We prove that the notion is applicable: we review the protocol using functional encryption so that it admits a verifiability test that preserves privacy to our definition. We analyse, in ProVerif, that the verifiability holds despite malicious parties and that the new protocol maintains all the security properties of the original protocol, so proving that our privacy-preserving verifiability can be achieved starting from existing security.
Disciplines :
Computer science
Author, co-author :
Giustolisi, Rosario; IT University of Copenhagen
Iovino, Vincenzo ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
Lenzini, Gabriele ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Privacy-Preserving Verifiability: A Case for an Electronic Exam Protocol
Publication date :
2017
Event name :
14th Conf. on Security and Cryptography
Event organizer :
ICEITE
Event place :
Madrid, Spain
Event date :
from 23-07-2017 to 26-07-2017
Audience :
International
Main work title :
Privacy-Preserving Verifiability: A Case for an Electronic Exam Protocol
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