References of "Derouiche, Imen 50022273"
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See detailBoard gender diversity and corporate social performance: Is there really a link?
Derouiche, Imen UL; Boubaker, Sabri; Dang, Rey et al

Scientific Conference (2017, July 05)

Our study aims to see whether and how board gender diversity (BGD) may influence the corporate social performance (CSP). Theoretically, we rely on the stakeholders’ theory. From an empirical standpoint ... [more ▼]

Our study aims to see whether and how board gender diversity (BGD) may influence the corporate social performance (CSP). Theoretically, we rely on the stakeholders’ theory. From an empirical standpoint, we employ a dynamic panel system GMM (generalized moments method) estimator to estimate a dynamic model of CSP. Our study is carried out on a sample of 101 listed firms on Euronext Paris that made up the SBF Index 250 over the 2006-2010 (be-fore the enactment of the Copé-Zimmermann on gender quota on boards). We find that board gender diversity significantly impacts CSP. Furthermore, a critical mass of female directors is significantly and positively correlated with CSP. The effect is economically significant. Finally, we take into account French specificities by examining the influence of family firms. We found that family firms contribute to the role of female directors regarding CSR activities, especially there is a critical mass of female directors in these firms. [less ▲]

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See detailOwnership structure and investment-cash flow sensitivity
Derouiche, Imen UL

in Journal of Management & Governance (2017)

This study investigates the effect of ownership structure on the use of cash flow in financing corporate investments—the investment-cash flow sensitivity—in a concentrated ownership context. Using a ... [more ▼]

This study investigates the effect of ownership structure on the use of cash flow in financing corporate investments—the investment-cash flow sensitivity—in a concentrated ownership context. Using a sample of 6797 French listed firms from 2000 to 2013, results show that investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases with the cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder and increases with the separation of its cash-flow and control rights (excess control rights). Firms are, thus, less likely to use cash flow in investments when the interests of controlling shareholders are aligned with those of minority shareholders. However, they appear to use considerable internal funds for their investments when they have severe agency problems, driven by excess control rights of the controlling shareholders. Overall, our findings help advance the understanding of the role of agency relationship in shaping corporate financial policy. [less ▲]

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See detailCorporate Ownership Structure and the Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash
Derouiche, Imen UL; Saffar, Walid; Boubaker, Sabri

Scientific Conference (2017, April 01)

This article examines the effects of excess control rights of the controlling shareholder and the presence of multiple large shareholders on financial constraints, proxied by cash flow sensitivity of cash ... [more ▼]

This article examines the effects of excess control rights of the controlling shareholder and the presence of multiple large shareholders on financial constraints, proxied by cash flow sensitivity of cash. Using a unique data set of 745 French listed firms during 1998—2013, the results show that firms have high cash flow sensitivity of cash when the controlling shareholder’s control rights exceed its cash-flow ownership. This sensitivity decreases, however, with the contestability of the controlling owner’s power. Taken together, these findings provide empirical support to the argument that firms experiencing excess control rights face considerable financial constraints that are lowered in the presence of high control contestability. [less ▲]

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See detailControl-ownership wedge and the survival of French IPOs
Derouiche, Imen UL; Narjess, Toumi

Presentation (2017)

This paper investigates the effect of separation between cash flow and control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholders (excess control) on the survival of French initial public offerings (IPOs ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates the effect of separation between cash flow and control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholders (excess control) on the survival of French initial public offerings (IPOs). Using a sample of 434 French IPOs issued during the 1997-2006 period, we estimate the Cox proportional hazard model based on the information that is available to investors from the prospectuses. The results show that excess control is positively associated with the rate of survival, meaning that failure is less likely to occur in IPOs with greater separation between ultimate cash flow and voting rights. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the potentially high private benefits of controlling shareholders with high levels of excess control give them strong incentives to preserve these benefits by preventing the failure of their firms. We also find support of prior evidence that IPOs are more likely to survive when they are older at the offering, when they have smaller number of risk factors listed in the firm prospectus, and when they have lower degree of underpricing. Our results hold under the use of accelerated-failure-time models as robustness checks. [less ▲]

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See detailVoluntary disclosure, ownership structure, and corporate debt maturity: A study of French listed firms
Derouiche, Imen UL

Scientific Conference (2017)

This study examines the effect of voluntary disclosure on the corporate debt maturity structure when control is concentrated and explores the role of controlling shareholder’s excess control rights in ... [more ▼]

This study examines the effect of voluntary disclosure on the corporate debt maturity structure when control is concentrated and explores the role of controlling shareholder’s excess control rights in this effect. Using a sample of 440 French listed firms over the period 2007-2013, the empirical results indicate that firms with higher voluntary disclosure have more long-term debt, suggesting that voluntary disclosure is valuable for lenders, thus allowing firms to access to more long-maturity debt. We also find that this positive effect is significant only in firms where controlling owners have high levels of excess control rights, meaning that the presence of entrenched controlling shareholders makes voluntary disclosure more highly valued by lenders. Our results provide interesting evidence of the substitution-monitoring effects between short-term debt and voluntary disclosure in firms with concentrated control. Our research also lends support to the findings of recent work that better disclosure policies are viewed more positively by the market in environments where the risk of wealth expropriation by controlling shareholders is higher. [less ▲]

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See detailFirm geographic location and voluntary disclosure
Derouiche, Imen UL

in Journal of Multinational Financial Management (2016)

This study aims to shed light on the effect of a firm’s geographic location on its voluntary disclosure policy. It hypothesizes that a firm’s geographic distance from metropolitan areas increases the cost ... [more ▼]

This study aims to shed light on the effect of a firm’s geographic location on its voluntary disclosure policy. It hypothesizes that a firm’s geographic distance from metropolitan areas increases the cost of oversight of managerial actions, which creates incentives for remotely located firms to make more voluntary disclosures in their annual reports that improve information available to investors and hence mitigate agency conflicts. Based on a sample of 260 French listed firms spanning the period 2007 to 2010, we find support for our hypothesis that as a firm’s distance from the Paris region increases, its level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports increases as well. This is consistent with the notion that remote firms are likely to pre-commit to higher voluntary disclosure so as to reduce oversight costs arising from geographic remoteness and mitigate agency conflicts. Our results are robust to alternative measures of voluntary disclosure, to several geographic location proxies, and to alternative estimation techniques. Collectively, they confirm the positive effect of distance on the extent of voluntary disclosure. [less ▲]

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See detailGeographic Location, Excess Control Rights, and Cash Holdings
Derouiche, Imen UL; Boubaker, Sabri; Meziane, Lasfer

in International Review of Financial Analysis (2015), 42

We assess the extent to which remotely-located firms are likely to discretionarily accumulate cash rather than distribute it to shareholders. We consider that these firms are less subject to shareholder ... [more ▼]

We assess the extent to which remotely-located firms are likely to discretionarily accumulate cash rather than distribute it to shareholders. We consider that these firms are less subject to shareholder scrutiny and, thus, will have high agency conflicts as the distance will facilitate the extraction of private benefits. Consistent with our predictions, we find a positive relation between the distance to the main metropolitan area and cash holdings, and this impact is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder has high levels of excess control rights (i.e., separation of cash-flow rights and control rights). Our results hold even after accounting for all control variables, including financial constraints, and suggest that geographic remoteness can be conducive to severe agency problems, particularly when there is a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. [less ▲]

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See detailDoes the board of directors affect cash holdings? A study of French listed firms
Derouiche, Imen UL; Boubaker, Sabri; Nguyen, Duc Khuong

in Journal of Management & Governance (2015), 19(2), 341-370

Prior studies show that agency conflicts are important in explaining corporate financial policies and that the board of directors is central to corporate governance. In this study, we examine the role of ... [more ▼]

Prior studies show that agency conflicts are important in explaining corporate financial policies and that the board of directors is central to corporate governance. In this study, we examine the role of this governing body in the accumulation of cash reserves. Using a sample of 597 French listed firms during 2001–2007, we find that firms with boards deemed to be effective in mitigating agency problems—that is, those appointing independent directors and splitting chief executive officer and chair positions—accumulate less cash reserves than those with less effective boards. Moreover, two-tier boards are more efficient in mitigating the agency costs of free cash flow, leading to less corporate cash hoarding. These findings support the idea that agency conflicts influence cash management policy and that effective boards of directors play an important disciplinary role in a concentrated ownership setting. [less ▲]

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See detailFamily control and the value of cash holdings
Derouiche, Imen UL

in Journal of Applied Business Research (2015), 31

The present study investigates the effects of family control on the value of corporate cash holdings. Using a large sample of French listed firms, the results show that the value of excess cash reserves ... [more ▼]

The present study investigates the effects of family control on the value of corporate cash holdings. Using a large sample of French listed firms, the results show that the value of excess cash reserves is lower in family firms than in other firms, reflecting investors’ concern about the potential misuse of cash by controlling families. We also find that the value of excess cash is lower when controlling families are involved in management and when they maintain a grip on control, indicating that investors do not expect the efficient use of cash in these firms. Our findings are consistent with the argument that the extent to which excess cash contributes to firm value is lower when dominant shareholders are likely to expropriate firm resources. Overall, family control seems to be a key determinant of cash valuation when ownership is concentrated. [less ▲]

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See detailControl-ownership wedge, board of directors, and the value of excess cash
Derouiche, Imen UL; Belkhir, Mohamed; Boubaker, Sabri

in Economic Modelling (2014), 39

This study investigates the effects of the separation of control and ownership on the value of cash holdings in publicly listed French firms. It also sheds light on the role of board independence in such ... [more ▼]

This study investigates the effects of the separation of control and ownership on the value of cash holdings in publicly listed French firms. It also sheds light on the role of board independence in such a relation. Theory suggests that investors are more likely to discount the value of excess cash held by firms with low corporate governance. Using the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998), empirical results show that the value of excess cash holdings decreases dramatically with the separation of control and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder. This value discount is, however, less pronounced in firms with more independent boards (i.e., boards with more independent directors and separate chief executive officer and chair positions). Our empirical findings support the argument that excess cash contributes less to firm value when minority shareholders are more likely to be expropriated by controlling shareholders. Independent boards seem to be effective in mitigating investors’ concerns about the use of excess cash. Overall, the results provide compelling evidence that cash valuation is largely influenced by corporate governance quality in a concentrated ownership setting. [less ▲]

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See detailQuel rôle pour le conseil d’administration dans la détention de liquidités ? Cas des entreprises françaises cotées
Derouiche, Imen UL

Book published by Lavoisier (2013)

La présente recherche s’inscrit dans la littérature liant la qualité du système de gouvernance et les politiques financières dans un contexte de propriété concentrée. Elle a pour objectif d’examiner ... [more ▼]

La présente recherche s’inscrit dans la littérature liant la qualité du système de gouvernance et les politiques financières dans un contexte de propriété concentrée. Elle a pour objectif d’examiner l’efficacité du conseil d’administration eu égard à l’effet de ses caractéristiques sur la détention de liquidités par les entreprises. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 33 (1 UL)