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THE CINEMATIC GAZE IN
EARLY GREEK CINEMA (1905-1945)

by VRASIDAS KARALIS

DEMYTHOLOGIZING GREEK AMERICAN FAMILIES

by Anna Karpathakis and Dan Georgakas

GREEK ANTI-AMERICANISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND THE
HELLENIC DIASPORA IN THE UNITED STATES

by Yannis A. Stivachtis

THE GREEK CASE: THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND
BRITISH MANIPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

by Spero S.Z. Paravantes

CAUGHT IN THE MESHES OF BETRAYAL: THE FICTION
OF KOSTAS KOTZIAS AND THE UNNAMABLE LEADER

by Thomas Doulis

KEVIN ANDREWS—AN APPRAISAL

by Anthony Papalas

BOOK REVIEWS

PELLA

The Greek Case: The Truman Doctrine and British Manipulation of the United States

by SPERO S.Z PARAVANTES

Throughout the early 20th century British interest in Greece went through varying periods of activity and dormancy. By 1942, during the course of World War II, the British had committed significant resources to training and equipping resistance groups opposed to the Axis occupying forces and to supporting the Greek government in exile. Once the German occupation ended, British aid to Greece increased dramatically, but the outbreak of violence in Athens in December 1944 alerted Britain to the scale of divisions within Greece foreshadowed the difficulties they would face in the future as they attempted to implement British policy. Although the Varkiza accord (February 12th 1945) was expected to stabilize Greece by settling many of the issues that had been plaguing the country since liberation, the two months following the agreement were extremely chaotic. Much of the aid coming into the country found its way into the hands of anti-Communists and government supporters, thereby slowing the distribution of food and increasing the instability throughout the small Balkan country.

Some authors have argued that British intervention in Greece was aimed at preserving their strategic interests in the Mediterranean by repressing the Greek people and by controlling the Greek government.¹ Others have stated that the creation of a stable parliamentary democracy was their objective.² In addition to

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the diversity of perspectives regarding British intentions, the role that they played in the origins of the Cold War has often been overlooked, particularly in reference to their actions in Greece.

Regardless of underlying British intentions, they committed significant resources for a prolonged period of time to this small, unstable Balkan nation. In February of 1947, however, the British made a major reversal of policy and informed that they could do no more in Greece. Less than a month later, American president Harry Truman appeared in front of the United States Congress and delivered his famous address in which he recommended a significant amount of aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent the two countries from falling under Communist control. In short, after having committed significant resources for many years to maintain Greece in their sphere of influence, the British decision to withdraw from Greece also meant manipulating the Americans into assuming support for British strategic interests in the Mediterranean.

The War Years

By July of 1940, British activities in Greece included British intelligence agents from both the newly formed Special Operations Executive (SOE) and MI6. They began to prepare the Greeks for a possible German occupation by cashing weapons and training saboteurs. Prime Minister Winston Churchill charged the SOE with organizing, training and equipping resistance groups across occupied Europe and acting as a liaison between the British government and those groups.³ The SOE had an office in Cairo and another in London, as well as in the Far East. It was composed of both military and civilian personnel who did most of their training at secret facilities in Scotland, but it had to requisition its equipment from the military with the approval of the Foreign Office. Therefore, at its inception, the SOE was destined to come into conflict with but be dependent upon the government agencies with whom it was supposed to operate. Many in the British military felt that the SOE wasted needed supplies on questionable endeavours with uncertain results. The Foreign Office disliked the SOE because officially it was not under the Foreign Office's control. This dislike would grow as events in Greece unfolded, and it had an immediate impact on the implementation of British policy in Greece.⁴

The SOE performed many duties in Greece as it acted as a liaison between the Foreign Office and the beginnings of what would become the Greek resistance groups. This was in addition to its duties of equipping and training saboteurs.⁵ The SOE's activities in Greece were kept secret because post-occupation planning may have implied that the defeat of Greece was inevitable, thereby undermining the will of the Greek military.⁶ The SOE was also charged with coordinating action against the expected German occupation force, and to relay intelligence to the British government about the Germans and the Greek Resistance should an occupation occur.⁷

When General Ioannis Metaxas died from a bout of tonsillitis on January 29, 1941 his death left a major void in the Greek government. The British encouraged King George II to fill the gap, but instead, the king appointed the former head of the national bank, Alex Koryzis, to lead the dictatorship while General Alexander Papagos retained control of the army corps.⁸ In spite of Metaxas' death, plans continued for the deployment of British troops in Greece. The SOE's ongoing efforts to recruit and train saboteurs demonstrated the British belief that should Germany invade Greece, there was very little chance that the *webrmacht* could be stopped. The decision to send the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to Greece by Prime Minister Winston Churchill over the objections of the Chiefs of Staff and the Commander in Chief for the Middle East. He hoped sending troops to Greece might stop a German advance, but his decision was a mainly as a demonstrative act for the benefit of Yugoslavia and Turkey and a supportive one to a loyal ally in King George II.⁹ When the Germans invaded Yugoslavia on April 6 1941, they quickly overran the Yugoslavian defensive position, and it took them only days to reach Macedonia, not weeks as had been anticipated by General Papagos. The British and Greek forces were quickly overrun, falling back again and again until they were finally evacuated by the Royal Navy.

On April 21, 1941, three days after the new Prime Minister Koryzis had committed suicide, General Papagos recommended that the remaining British forces, the Greek government and the Greek king be evacuated to Crete. The Germans, however, attacked Crete sooner and with greater force than had been anticipated, forcing another evacuation, this time to Cairo. As the mil-

itary situation continued to deteriorating, so to was the political situation. In the chaotic months following the death of Metaxas, the King George lost an opportunity to establish a government that had the confidence of the Greek people, first by choosing to surround himself with monarchists and second by agreeing to have the government in exile moved to London. In so doing, he isolated himself from the Greeks who were fleeing to the Middle East and who could have given him realistic appraisals of conditions in Greece.¹⁰ On the other hand, the British had an opportunity to force the Greek government to become more representative. Instead, viewing King George as a client, they made the decision to support him. As the Germans assumed control of Greece they established a quisling government under General George Tsolakoglou.

The gap between republicans and royalists continued to widen in February 1942, and although King George reinstated the constitution and signed a decree ending the Metaxas regime, it did not mend the divisions within the government. The king was not popular, and being so far removed from the country which he was supposed to govern allowed his opponents to challenge his right to do so.¹¹ Furthermore, since the occupation began, groups within Greece had been forming that opposed his return. The KKE had created the National Liberation Front, EAM, in September 1941 and had charged it with liberating Greece, guaranteeing the country complete independence and the formation of a provisional government after liberation using "any means at its disposal." The KKE was careful to hide its controlling role and creatively formed EAM as a coalition of many of the Greek parties opposed to the occupation.¹² In 1942 Komninos Pyromaglou and Colonel Napoleon Zervas established the non-Communist National Republican Hellenic League, EDES. Its objectives were to take up arms against the occupational forces, to restore order after their withdrawal and to establish a republic. The KKE leadership believed in a workers' uprising in the cities was essential to forward its political and social agendas.¹³ Other KKE cadres believed in the necessity of guerrilla warfare. As a result EAM formed the People's Liberation Army of Greece, ELAS, in January of 1942, and by March of 1942 ELAS had begun to organize guerrilla bands.¹⁴ At the height of their power, EDES had about 5000 members. It relied on volunteers to make up its numbers, but they

never amounted to much more than a quarter of the 20,000 guerillas that ELAS commanded when the British returned to Greece in October 1944.¹⁵ As the occupation continued, EDES had difficulty getting new recruits because men who were not yet involved in the resistance were often reluctant to leave their homes undefended, particularly in the north where the Bulgarians were in control.¹⁶ The SOE concentrated its efforts with these two groups. The fact that neither group was inclined to accept the return of a Greek government that was officially recognised and supported by the British government would cause many problems for the British.

The SOE informed the Foreign Office that while some of the resistance groups would do what the British asked, the Republicans, Venizelists and Communists would not. The proposed solution to this problem was to have the government in exile radically alter its policy by promising to hold a plebiscite before the king would return to Greece. This was not a popular option to the Foreign Office then under the leadership of Sir Anthony Eden; and the Foreign Office constantly pressured the SOE to force the issue with the various emerging factions. The Foreign Office was unwilling to accept the fact that in Greece, those who were most willing to revolt, were also those least willing to accept the return of the king. As the war continued, most of the resistance leaders who took part in resistance activities did so, not only to fight the occupying forces, but to secure their places in the post-occupation political environment in Greece. It was a problem that would continue to affect the course of resistance activities in Greece throughout the occupation.¹⁷ An immediate problem that the Greek government in exile and the various Greek resistance groups had confronted was the shortage of food in Greece.

In response to the German occupation of Greece, the British had implemented an encirclement policy. The British naval blockade, coupled with the Axis confiscation of foodstuffs for their own needs, rapidly created shortages of food. There were clear indications of famine by mid-1942. After many pleas by the Greek government in exile, the British decided to allow small shipments of food to come to Greece from Turkey.¹⁸ These shipments were of insufficient quantities to fend off a famine during the winter of 1942-43. In spite of the dire situation of the Greek people, the Foreign Office would not increase the shipments of food to the

country, even though it did allow food to be shipped to Vichy France.¹⁹ The Foreign Office acted as though the post-war opinions of the people of France and of General DeGaulle were more important considerations than the lives of the people of Greece. Additionally, while the Greek people suffered, those claiming to be acting on their behalf, the Greek Resistance leadership, the Greek government and the British advisors, did not share the hardships of living through a famine. The British used the blockade to defeat Germany, and the Foreign Office believed that shortages of food would make it more difficult for the Germans to administer their occupied territories.²⁰

What turned out to be a more influential factor in encouraging resistance was the brutality of the occupational forces and the devastation they wrought upon Greek society.²¹ The Italians and Bulgarians were put in control of key areas, and quickly Greece was stripped of all material and food surpluses, leading to a deep hatred of the occupying forces. Though the king and Tsouderos begged the British to lift the blockade, the British refused.²² This refusal illustrated the lack of importance the British placed on the objectives of the Greek government in exile. As Mark Mazower has written, referring to the quisling authorities in Greece, "The tens of thousands of victims who died of hunger in the first winter of occupation testified to the political and administrative impotence of the Greek state machine in Athens. In effect, Greece barely existed as a political entity."²³ The same could be said of the Greek government in exile, but in spite of its apparent insignificance the British continued to support it.

The reason for continued British support of the exile government was that the Greek monarchy was an ally and represented legitimacy. Although C.M. Woodhouse believed this support was based on King George's staunch loyalty to Britain during the first phase of the Second World War,²⁴ Andre Gerolymatos believes that had the British not supported the internationally recognised government of King George II, they would have indirectly given credibility to the quisling government in Athens. In short, in the absence of any viable alternatives, they had no choice but to support the king.²⁵ They focused on training resistance groups that could keep the occupational forces occupied, thereby tying up troops and equipment that otherwise might have been used elsewhere in areas such as North Africa and later, Sicily.²⁶ This strat-

egy was not favoured by the Greek government in exile which felt that the support of such groups would undermine their attempt to govern the country upon their return. On the surface British policy was supporting King George II and the war effort, but through the actions of the SOE, British policy was supporting groups who were opposed to the agenda of the government in exile. The SOE's agents made contact with Venezelists, Communists, and other Metaxas opponents as part of Churchill's order "to set Europe ablaze." The traditional British intelligence services such as MI6 had also contacts with monarchists and other pre-occupation supporters of Metaxas. Nonetheless, British policy up to and during the Second World War was destined to keep Greece as divided as it had been in the 1920s. This may have been a deliberate plan to keep Greece weak, and therefore continuously in the British sphere of influence. The SOE used republicans and Communists because they were the most willing and able to operate underground. On the other hand, most of those loyal to the king and the Greek government were satisfied with the current political situation and if they decided to resist the occupation at all, it was decided too late, and they were therefore of little use to British intelligence.²⁷

Although the occupying forces presented a common enemy, the forces that would rise up to oppose these occupiers had diverging political agendas. The British expected that these agendas would be put aside until the end of the war. That, however, was too much to expect of a war-weary population that would suffer terribly during the Occupation and Civil War. The violence and uncertainty of the 1930s was to continue throughout the 1940s, and as had happened countless times over the previous centuries, considerations beyond the control of the Greek government in exile and the resistance groups in Greece, would determine the course that British policy would soon take.

British policy sought to strengthen the governing institutions and the economy while internationally and domestically, maintaining an image that they were as "hands off" as much as possible.²⁸ By ensuring that Greece could sustain itself and that the Communists could not assume power by force, the British would be able to retain Greece as a sphere of influence without having to maintain a strong and expensive military presence. The Varkiza accord, signed Feb 12, 1945, was supposed to mark the end of the Second Round of the Greek Civil War, but it also marked the

beginning of the end for Winston Churchill.

Throughout the course of the war, Churchill had dedicated himself to doing everything in his power to defeat Germany. Flying around the world, meeting with allies and formulating allied policy had left him little time to deal with domestic issues in England. That responsibility he had entrusted to his Labour Party deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.²⁹ Since the fall of 1944, the British parliament had been setting its sights on an election in 1945 once Germany had been defeated.³⁰ The coalition government, which had set aside political differences to unite the country to fight the Axis had begun to splinter once the defeat of the Third Reich appeared imminent. One of the first signs that the coalition was falling apart was the criticism that Churchill received from labour MP's for his treatment of EAM/ELAS and the rest of the Greek Left during the December Uprising.

In the year and a half between the Cairo conference and the Varkiza agreement, the British view of the KKE had gone through numerous dramatic shifts; from allies to suspicious friends, to open combatants. British policy towards Greece had also changed, initially focussing almost exclusively on resistance against the Germans and the return of King George, then broadening to include the formation of a parliamentary democracy and the ramifications that events on the international front had in Greece and vice versa. The KKE made a major mistake engaging the British in Athens in December of 1944; but although the KKE had tipped its hand showing the Allies that they were prepared to control Greece by armed force if necessary, the British refrained from destroying them.

In the six months following Varkiza, numerous international events drew British attention from Greece. The defeat of Germany and Japan, in addition to the troubling Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and the British elections contributed to a growing directionless political vacuum in Anglo-Greek relations. The political factions in Greece on both the Left and the Right were free to disregard the peace accord because there was less and less overriding authority to enforce their compliance, but the Left hoped that once the British elections had been conducted that British foreign policy would become more accommodating. As Labour Party leader Clement Atlee was poised to replace Churchill a Prime Minister, many expected British-Soviet-Greek relations to

improve.³¹ In Greece, Zachariades was quoted in *Rizospastisas* stating "the British elections will change the system of (foreign) intervention."³² However, the expected pro-left shift did not occur with Atlee's election. Despite having pre-eminent Labour leaders as the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, British policy in Greece became even more hostile to the Greek Communists. This occurred not only because of international developments, but also because EAM/ELAS' status as an ally had been granted by the previous British administration. With the change from a Tory to a Labour government, the pressure to adhere to wartime agreements seems to have diminished.

This rising hostility to the KKE was also bred out of the realities of what the Second World War had done to Europe. France had been devastated and deeply divided by the German Occupation. Germany was defeated, broken and defenceless. Italy was bankrupt and Eastern Europe was rapidly being swept up into the Soviet sphere of influence and the new Labour government in England realised that it was going to have to protect itself by participating in the rebuilding of Western Europe.³³ Furthermore, by the end of the summer of 1945, the USA seemed intent to free itself from the wartime alliance with Britain leaving Britain alone to deal with a rapidly and aggressively expanding USSR. These realities began to take the gleam off the idea that socialist ideals could bridge the gap between Britain and the USSR, or, in relation to the affairs in Greece, bring the KKE and its affiliates to participate in the Greek government. Britain needed the crises in Greece to come to a quick end in order to be able to redirect British troops and funds to Western Europe. After the election of the summer of 1945, Churchill and Eden were replaced by Atlee and Bevin. Whereas the former had been attempting to extricate themselves from Greece, the latter decided to commit more resources to maintaining Greece as a British sphere of influence. Behind Britain's policy decisions of 1945 was the spectre of Soviet expansion and the subsequent need to decide whether or not to expend more manpower to secure the Greek countryside against the rising violence taking place. The "White Terror" drove many ELAS members and left-wingers into the mountains where they had to band together for protection. As a result, by the end of 1945, the groundwork for the emerging Democratic Army of Greece, the DSE, was in place. Ambassador Leeper believed the only solution

was for the British to assume executive power in Greece because he felt the country was incapable of generating the leadership necessary to help it sustain freedom. The Ambassador's plan was not favoured by the British government in general as it would have required an increased role for the British at the very time they wished to diminish it. Rather than Labour, it was Eden and Churchill who best understood the futility of trying to re-mould the Greeks into a British model. They had believed that it was far more detrimental to maintain Greece as a dependent, than to have it engulfed in chaos and lost as an ally. When the Labour government came to power in July 1945, it implemented a policy that precariously combined the non-intervention advocated by Churchill and the assumption of control favoured by Leeper.³⁴ The results of this policy proved disastrous for the people of Greece.

From July 1945 to March 1947

British policy towards Greece at this time, more so than any preceding period, was characterised by an increased focus on the preservation of British interests in Greece and in the Mediterranean. The new British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin had grown up in poverty, worked in unions, led trade unions, had been the Minister of Labour during the War, and although he was characterised by others and himself as a socialist, he had no love for communists.³⁵ During the War, Bevin was outspoken in his support for Churchill's government's policy of opposing the EAM/ELAS movement in Greece. He was also a supporter of the Commonwealth and of a British military and economic presence in the Middle East.³⁶ To secure British access to Persia through the Suez Canal, a non-communist Greece was essential and it held the added bonus of cutting off the Soviets from the Mediterranean if the need arose. This section will illustrate that although a plan to manipulate the United States into assuming responsibility for Greece was likely not conceived until July 1946, Bevin did increase British involvement in Greece up to that point with the objective of maintaining a British presence in Europe. However, as conditions both in Greece and in Britain worsened, it is reasonable to assume that the British would have sought a policy to solve their economic difficulties without compromising their national

security interests. A logical policy to do accomplish those objectives would be to manoeuvre the United States into assuming responsibility for Greece in March of 1947.

By this time two members of the "Big Three" had been replaced and as a result, the relations between, and the priorities of, Britain, the United States and the USSR were altered. Strategically, Greece was an important but not vital country for the British and the Americans. The Americans' main concern at this time was the defeat of Japan, and even after the Japanese surrender on September 2nd, they remained intensely focussed on the pacific sphere. The new threat looming in the Pacific was the possibility of a communist China as Mao Tse Tsung was embroiled in a civil war against the nationalist Chiang Kai-Shek. Soon after the armistice with Japan was signed, the United States began to focus on rebuilding the Japanese economy and government. Following the Allied example of rebuilding efforts in Western Europe to oppose communist expansion, they believed that the most effective barrier to communism in the pacific would be an economically powerful Japan.³⁷ The new government under Harry Truman was operating quite differently from the wartime administration of Roosevelt.³⁸ Therefore, with regards to Greece, at this time the Americans kept appraised of developments but they were content to leave the country in the hands of the British. As for the Soviets, Stalin also appeared to be comfortable to let events unfold on their own. Though a communist Greece would have been beneficial, Stalin was not willing to jeopardise his claim to Eastern Europe by provoking the Allies and openly helping the KKE. He continually advised the Greek Communists to participate in the elections and in the government, and he answered their continuous requests for weapons and other supplies with vague statements of future support, giving them enough hope to keep fighting but not enough to actually sustain their efforts.³⁹ By this point, Britain was experiencing severe financial hardships, and the conflict in Greece was a major risk to the significant economic investments Britain had made to the Greek government. The previous administration's support of the Greek Monarchy stemmed from the King's staunch loyalty to Britain at the beginning of the war, but Bevin's support of the Right in Greece stemmed from the post-war economic and social realities he was facing. In a memorandum he presented to the cabinet on August 14th 1945, he stated that it was vital for

the British to maintain their influence in Greece in order to safeguard their strategic interests in the Middle East.⁴⁰ Furthermore, as a result of Soviet involvement in Poland, and by US involvement in France, Bevin believed that it was crucial for Britain to maintain her presence in Greece in order to maintain her status in the postwar world order. Atlee and Bevin, committed Labour Party socialists with a labour party bureaucracy behind them, saw elections as the solution to their problems in Greece which would in turn allow them to deal with the looming threat of the Soviet Union.⁴¹

1945: September-December

In September 1945, as Greece was once again in the midst of a massive economic crisis, the issue of holding the plebiscite before the elections was under review. Archbishop Damaskinos flew to London and proposed to Bevin that the allied powers support a plan to delay the plebiscite for three years. Bevin then met with the American Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to determine the American stance on this issue. Byrnes stated that although he was hesitant to delay it for three years, he would assume joint responsibility with the British for the proposal. Although this plan failed to promote unity among the various political parties, under their pressure Voulgaris proclaimed elections for January 20, 1946.⁴² However, the decision did not improve conditions in Greece, and economic and political disorder grew to such levels that ambassador Leeper believed that the British had to assume executive power in order to save the country. However, after having involved himself in the constitutional affairs of Greece already, Bevin was hesitant at this time to become any more engaged. On October 9, 1945, Bevin informed ambassador Leeper that the Greeks had to learn how to govern their country for themselves. Leeper informed Damaskinos of Bevin's intentions but nevertheless felt entitled to recommend the formation of a left-center government, but the Regent remained focused on forming a cabinet composed of both royalists and Republicans because he believed it would promote unity. This decision did not have the desired effects.

Between September and November 1945, the Greek government was re-constituted 3 times. Acting Prime Minister Admiral

Voulgaris resigned on Oct 9th 1945, and until the first week of November 1945, no one could be convinced to form a coalition government. M. Sophoulis formed a government which lasted only two days, so the Regent then assumed the presidency until November 2nd.⁴³

Bevin instructed ambassador Leeper to inform the Regent to create a government of all parties willing to work together with the exception of the extremes on the left and right (i.e.: the KKE and the royalists). However, Bevin's message arrived too late. The next Prime Minister, M. Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, formed a government and even though he attempted to fill his cabinet with individuals who would appeal to both liberals and royalists it was badly received by the press.⁴⁴ Being somewhat withdrawn from the highly politicised atmosphere of the previous administrations Kanellopoulos did not have the partisan support from any area necessary to form a stable government.⁴⁵ By the 15th of November he resigned and was replaced by M. Sophoulis on the 26th, whom again it was believed, could form a government with the "widest possible unity."⁴⁶ However, this new government excluded the communists and the socialists and committed "the tactical error of freeing them from responsibility for the welfare of their country."⁴⁷ Furthermore, as the governments continued to change there was a lack of economic and fiscal policy to deal with the economic catastrophe that was unfolding in Greece, and despite Bevin's stated desire to refrain from interfering in Greek affairs his actions indicated the opposite. His decision to postpone the plebiscite and his instructions to Damaskinos resulted in a Republican government.⁴⁸

Furthermore, in accordance with Bevin's plan to hold elections as quickly as possible, at the end of November 1945 advance parties of the Allied Mission for the Observation of Greek Elections (AMFOGE) arrived in Athens. Their preliminary report illustrated the growing role that the Americans would play in the future of Greece.⁴⁹ However, AMFOGE's arrival did not guarantee the endorsement of the elections by the KKE. On December 12 1945, it declared that it would abstain from participation in the committee for the registration of its members and then from the elections completely.⁵⁰ Their abstention would make it difficult for the British to show Greece's communist neighbours that a fair and open election was taking place. However, plans for the

election continued in spite of the protests from the KKE. In his summary of 1945 in Greece, Sir Reginald Leeper summed up British and Greek sentiment as he saw it:

I do not think that the Greeks yet appreciate how much has been done for them by their British Allies. This arises partly from the fact that they feel we are here primarily in our own interest because Greece is necessary to us . . . and Anglo-Greek relations have on the whole become less cordial during the past year. The British troops resent the fact that the Greeks do so little to help themselves and expect so much to be done for them by us . . . It says much for the patience of the British temperament that things have gone as well as they have during the past year . . . If I believed that Greece was to continue as at present for many years to come, I would take a very bleak view of her future, but I believe that the Greek people are very much better than their present politicians and that if we can help them to stand on their feet again they may produce better men to conduct their affairs.⁵¹

1946-January to September

The main issue that the British would deal with over these months was the holding of the elections, which, despite Bevin's claims to desire the establishment of an independent Parliamentary Democracy, would allow the British to maintain their position of influence in Greek affairs. Once that was accomplished they could deal with the plebiscite on the return of King George which would represent the successful implementation of their longest standing policy objective. The increasing American role was demonstrated on January 11th when the United States' government granted Greece a twenty-five million dollar loan in an attempt to mitigate the economic crisis and to create a favourable atmosphere for the successful holding of national elections.⁵² This was followed by a 10.5 million pound loan from the British Government to stabilise the drachma on January 24th 1946. Bevin stated that it was necessary to stabilize the Greek economy before the elections could take place, but he warned the British Parlia-

ment that all of the financial assistance they were giving would only be of value if it were part of a larger economic plan. However, this economic aid to the Greek government was overshadowed by a Soviet demand on January 22nd 1946 for Britain to withdraw her troops, which they stated were preventing the Greeks from obtaining freedom.⁵³ The Soviets continued their attack on the British presence in Greece by lodging an official protest with the United Nations and by re-iterating their demand for a British withdrawal. Even though the Greek Ambassador to London, M. Sophianopoulos, issued a statement to the British press stating that the British troops were in Greece at the request of "successive Greek Governments," there was considerable fallout from Russia's demand. The KKE received powerful ammunition for its escalating propaganda campaign against the British and Greek governments, and it may have been encouraged by Stalin's comments.⁵⁴ Leeper believed that this statement would encourage the Greek Communists even more because they would interpret it as the Soviets saying to the KKE that their time had come to be high on the list of Soviet foreign policy.⁵⁵ It is also possible that as a result of the Soviet Union's statements, EAM was encouraged to boycott the elections, just as Zachariadis had been stating it would do since September of 1945. When the March 31st election was held, the Leftist boycott resulted in a decisive victory for the Right.⁵⁶ However, this decision proved costly to the KKE. Zachariadis had made the success of the Greek Left dependent upon outside factors that he could neither predict nor control, namely the support of the Soviets or other communist nations, and none of them properly assessed US interest in the Mediterranean and Middle East.⁵⁷ Though the election had taken place with relative calm, the results spelled disaster for Greece. As Woodhouse stated in reference to the 1945 governments that excluded the communists, the KKE's boycott of the elections once again freed its members from taking responsibility for the wellbeing of their nation and shortly thereafter they focussed on pursuing the armed struggle.⁵⁸

In April, Zachariadis boasted to his potential supporters in the USSR and Yugoslavia that by eluding the provisions of the Varkiza Accord, ELAS had retained a considerable number of machine guns, rifles and other military equipment.⁵⁹ Throughout March and April of 1946, Zachariadis attempted to enlist the aid of Tito and the Yugoslav communist party since the KKE planned to field

an army of fifteen to twenty thousand armed guerrillas but it still needed substantial foreign aid to do so.⁶⁰ However the KKE had a setback in April when Stalin ordered the KKE to search for a compromise to prevent "an untimely armed intervention by the British."⁶¹ The Soviets believed that the British were determined to hold onto Greece, and Bevin's continued interference in the Greek government seemed to support their view. Though he stated that the Greeks had to learn how to form their own government he also believed that the British should have a say in its composition. He instructed the new British Ambassador M. Clifford Norton to inform Prime Minister Tsaldaris that the most suitable government for Greece would be a broad coalition.

Meanwhile the USSR continued to attack the British as imperialist, pointing out their large military forces stationed around the world, especially in Palestine, Iraq, and Greece, and it was not until the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers in May 1946, that the United States began to take over the brunt of Soviet hostility from the British. International tension was further increased by the Soviets' refusal to sign on to a twenty-five year non aggression pact with the Western Powers. The situation in Germany was deteriorating as well, as the British and American zones in Berlin began to unify in reaction to the instability in the Soviet zone, and the British and Soviets remained entrenched in their nearly irreconcilable positions in every arena.⁶² It is therefore not surprising that the inability of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union to guarantee non-aggression or to sign any agreements of significance would encourage instability in Greece between the forces of the extreme Right and Left. If the patrons of the extremes in Greece could not reach an understanding, how could the communists and non-communists be expected to do so? Therefore the people of Greece were faced with an armed faction on the Left that increasingly believed that the only route to power was now through violence, a government on the Right that was detaining thousands of people without trial and was incapable of dealing with the economic crisis, and the British who were increasingly ignored by all of the factions in Greece. Though the various Missions continued their work, their impact was dramatically lessened as a consequence of the British decision to remove their troops.⁶³

On May 13, 1946 with the approval of the British, the Tsaldaris government announced that the plebiscite would take place

on September 4th. Perhaps realizing the mistake it made by not participating in the March elections the KKE began to urge its members to register in order to be able to take part in the plebiscite. However, this measure was taken too late to make much of a difference since the forces of the Right were firmly in control and the British continued their preparations to leave.⁶⁴ Throughout June and July 1946, as fighting between the Communists and various right-wing forces was escalating, Premier Tsaldaris met with various British and American diplomats in his attempts to secure greater foreign loans to rebuild Greece. However, the dramatic increase in right-wing violence in Greece and destabilize the country to such a level that increasing British investment was not likely.⁶⁵ By the end of July 1946, the Chancellor of the Exchequer informed Prime Minister Attlee that the British "had reached a point where we could do no more," and "for the next year or so we should have to deny our friends, including the Greeks, any future credits."⁶⁶ Britain had reached the breaking point financially and though they wanted to be sure that their policy in Greece since November 1944 had not been a complete failure they were caught in the post-war economic crisis. Shortly thereafter, the Greek Government began to look towards the United States for financial assistance. Prime Minister Tsaldaris had feared that the British would be offended by his approaching the US for financial assistance but the Chancellor of the Exchequer replied that far from objecting "he would welcome such a step" because at the present time the Americans were in a better position financially than the British.⁶⁷ In Paris, the Greek Prime Minister spoke with American Foreign Minister Byrnes about future loans from the Export-Import Bank and Byrnes replied that if the Bank began to get short of funds he would ask the US congress for more. From this point on the Greek government would increasingly be aided by the United States and this marked the beginning of the decisive shift in British Policy in Greece.

Britain could no longer manage her affairs in Greece the way she had after nearly seven years of being heavily involved. The majority of the decisions the British would now make with regards to Greece were designed to facilitate their exit, at least publicly.⁶⁸ Furthermore, conditions in Greece worsened and showed no signs of abating. On August 13th 1946, Bevin received a dispatch informing him that the first efforts of the Greek government to co-

ordinate on a large-scale anti-Communist action between the Army and the gendarmes had been largely unsuccessful which was mainly due to a lack of communication and a failure to define which group would have situational control over the other. Bevin's Charge d'Affaires D.W. Lascelles, then informed Bevin that the Greek forces in Northern Greece were operating with the powers of martial law but the Greek Government was not admitting it because it did not want to admit that conditions were unsuitable for holding the plebiscite, and Bevin was therefore concerned with the international reaction to the plebiscite when it was held on September 1st.⁶⁹

Although Bevin had stood up in parliament and said that the Russians "wanted to go right across the throat of the British Empire," and had spent much of his tenure as Foreign Secretary opposing Russian expansion and influence at every step,⁷⁰ he wanted to ensure that there could be little or no objection to the process of holding the plebiscite. Fortunately for Bevin, the plebiscite took place without significant incidents, and the result was an overwhelming victory for the Royalists.⁷¹ British reports about the levels of violence after the plebiscite however showed that clashes were increasing in Thessaly, the Peloponnese, and Western Macedonia and that the communists were reinforcing their armed bands. Though the gendarmes seemed to be dealing with the situation well, the British observed that the same could not be said of the Greek Army who, "appearing to have had little heart for the arduous, dangerous, and often disappointing operations necessary to round up Communist guerrillas during the summer."⁷² It was into these conditions that the Greek Monarch returned to Greece.

King George II made his formal entry into Athens on September 28th and Ambassador Norton felt that it would be difficult to integrate the king into the new Greek political structure, believing the Royalists would probably become disillusioned with him since he preferred to associate with "British officials" and his "English friends," and to read his English newspapers. In addition to coping with the return of the King, September 1946 was the worst month for organised acts of violence directed against the state since the Varkiza Agreement had been signed.⁷³ Through the British kept troops in Greece over the next year, the return of King George II may be seen as the symbolic end of their engagement in

Greece and British troop reductions began when the King returned. In order to accomplish their withdrawal they allowed the forces of the Right in Greece to consolidate their power. It was an option at the time that would allow the British to retain Greece, if not in its sphere of influence, then at least as an ally, without having to maintain a troop presence that they could no longer afford.

Over the previous year British Policy had continued towards the creation of a parliamentary democracy in Greece and the national army to support it. The holding of elections and the plebiscite, and the reformation of the justice system and the economy were key parts of that plan. However, these measures became a mechanism not for greater British control, but to help lure the United States into Greek affairs. This expediency, while successful for the British, had disastrous consequences for the people of Greece who would have to live through another three years of war and economic disarray, dealing with the insecurity, violence, and hardships that followed.

1946: October to December

Though as yet there has been no released (or discovered) British document to confirm or deny the theory that the British deliberately manipulated the United States into assuming support for British objectives through the declaration of the Truman doctrine, an answer may be surmised by the actions of the British during their final months in Greece. Between the return of King George II and Harry Truman's address in March 1947 the British continued their troop withdrawal. It was a slow process for many reasons, not the least of which was the right-wing trend of the Greek government, and the rapidly escalating violence between the Greek Army and the Greek Left. Though it took 6 months to secure, and only after British Troop reductions had begun in September, in October 1946 the Yugoslavians decided to help the KKE with money and supplies with Stalin's approval.⁷⁴ Aside from increasing the violence in Greece, the supplies for the DSE and the composition of the Greek government made it difficult initially for the British to get assurances of aid for Greece from the United States. On November 9th 1946 Ambassador MacVeagh, speaking to Ambassador Norton, said bluntly that "the American

Government could hardly be expected to rush to the help of Greece while extreme Right-wing elements . . . held important positions in the government." As the Greek government applied for more loans from the American and British governments, Liberal and Left wing presses wrote that such loans should only be granted if the Greek government broadened its political platform, but the escalating violence throughout the country, while preventing that from happening, also continued to create high levels of anxiety, especially as the anti-government bands seemed to be operating out of neighbouring countries with increasing frequency.⁷⁵

On December 12th 1946, Minister Papandreou, basically admitting that Greece was embroiled in war again, said that appeasement was impossible and "the question was now whether Greece should defend herself against the Communist Party or submit to it." As 1946 drew to a close, conditions were not much more promising than they had been a year earlier. The government of Attlee had worked for a year and a half to bring Greece out of the shadow of the occupation and the early stages of the civil war. Unfortunately, the international conditions created by the widening gap between wartime allies contributed to Britain's inability to overcome those very challenges. As another New Year approached, there was little in the way of optimism facing it and in his dispatch to Foreign Secretary Bevin on December 28th 1946, Ambassador Norton said, "Nothing in Greece seems to stay put for very long, except the Acropolis."⁷⁶ By the end of 1946, it certainly seemed as though the British were in as desperate situation as they presented. The Chancellor of the Exchequer could lend no more money, the people in England were using food stamps, even as the violence in Greece was worsening the British continued to remove their troops, and everything they had worked for since October 1944 was in jeopardy. Because Greece was the only Eastern European nation to have a diverse democratically elected government it became an important symbol for the West, and the Americans would have to make a decision on whether to support it or not, and as tensions between the USSR and the United States began to escalate US reservations about helping Greece began to dissipate.⁷⁷

At the end of 1946 Atlee stated that in his opinion that the nations bordering the Soviet Union could not be made strong enough to form a barrier and that the British did not have the

resources to make them so. Furthermore he stated that it was difficult to know how much Soviet policy was dictated by fear of attack from the United States and Great Britain, or by expansionism, and perhaps the British should attempt to reach an agreement with Russia to mutually disinterest themselves from these "border" nations.⁷⁸ However, Bevin vigorously opposed Attlee's suggestion. He believed that to withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Middle East would be "Munich over again, only on a world scale with Greece, Turkey and Persia as the first victims in place of Czechoslovakia." Bevin then stated that to withdraw would also be very damaging on British-American relations, since the British were dependent upon them economically and militarily, and because it had taken great effort to persuade the United States that the maintenance of the British position in the Middle East was in their strategic interests. Furthermore, Bevin believed that being linked to the United States the British would be able to negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength.⁷⁹ As a result of his need of Bevin's support in the cabinet and upon his influence with the trade unions, Attlee gave way to Bevin's policy, and committed Britain to the coming Cold War.⁸⁰ Therefore, if there were a plan to manoeuvre the United States into assuming support for British interests in Greece, it seems likely that it was made at some point near the end of 1946.

1947: January to March

Although Attlee had been looking to disengage Britain from some of her international obligations since the beginning of 1946, by January 1947, the only areas that he felt he could do so were Greece and Turkey, because he believed that in these countries, the Americans could be persuaded to take Britain's role.⁸¹ The next tangible sign to the British that the Americans would become more directly involved in Greece came on February 15 in Washington. General Marshall stated, "It is to the interest of the United States and of all the United Nations that Greece be assisted to maintain her independence and national integrity."⁸² On February 19th 1946, Bevin instructed the British ambassador to the United States, Lord Inverchapel, to deliver a memorandum to the US State Department regarding the situation in Greece. It expressed the

British desire to have the United States assist the Greek armed forces and economy since the country was on the verge of collapse. It also stated that Britain's aid to Greece was expiring on March 31, after which the British would be unable to grant any further assistance whatsoever. Although this memorandum shocked the State Department, it quickly decided to convince the American people and Congress of the need to for the United States to assume a more significant role "in the direction of world affairs" and to seize the opportunity given to it by Britain's decision.⁸³

Since the end of the Second World War, the US government had opposed the USSR's practice of spreading its influence through various local communist parties, but had done little to stop it.⁸⁴ That changed on March 12, 1947. President Truman addressed the US Congress about giving aid to Greece and Turkey in a speech that made the United States' opposition to the expansion of Soviet influence official. Truman informed the US Congress that "assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation." After summarising Greece's non-military needs and requests, Truman addressed the military situation in the country.

The very existence of the Greek State is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points particularly along the northern boundaries . . . the Greek government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance.⁸⁵

This announcement committed the United States to assume the role that the British had been performing in Greece since 1944. The British government could no longer justify expensive foreign commitments and when they reached their breaking point, the Americans took over and finished the job as patrons of a non-Communist Greece; a role the British had performed for so long. Attlee was anxious to extricate Britain from Greece so his government could focus on rebuilding Britain and Germany. The Soviets

already had a foothold in Eastern Germany and it appeared likely they were going to end up controlling Poland. Attlee believed that Britain's security depended on a non-Communist Germany that would serve as a buffer against Soviet expansion into Western Europe.

Although Attlee had been elected in the near euphoric period immediately following the defeat of Germany, the enthusiasm had rapidly dissipated as it became clear that the greatest threat to Britain was now the Soviet Union. A new world conflict was emerging. Somewhat symbolic of the end of the old Greco-British relationship, on April 1, 1947, King George II died suddenly of a heart attack.⁸⁶ It was sadly ironic that so much blood had been shed in the years following the German occupation to arrange for the return of a king to Greece whose new reign in the homeland would last barely six months.

No released document contains any concrete evidence of a British plan to force the Americans into assuming their role in Greece, but Britain's official memorandum to the State Department which stated that they were unable to aid Greece any further, to indicates a strong suggestion if not an actual plan on their part to persuade the Americans to take over.⁸⁷ In addition, the fact that in the spring of 1948 the British reversed positions again and informed the Americans that they would allow their troops to remain in Greece for an indefinite period, in spite of increased American military involvement in Greece by this time, could also support the theory that manipulation of the United States took place, i.e.: In February 1947, the British led the Americans to believe that their situation was more desperate than it actually was.⁸⁸

Despite the promise of American aid, the British still played a significant role in Greece beyond October 1947 when the American aid program actually began. As the Soviet threat continued to grow in 1947, the Americans decided that it was time to take action and did so in an overwhelming manner, sending millions of dollars in aid and military supplies to fight the DSE. As it was for the Axis in the Second World War, once the Americans became involved it was only a matter of time for the DSE until it was defeated. With no significant international aid, the DSE was unable to last the decade in Greece and was defeated in November 1949. Whatever the motivations and fears of the parties involved

in Greece, the end result of the actions of the KKE and the three superpowers was that many Greeks suffered and died. There were almost a million casualties during the occupation and civil war out of a population of only eight million, and that, more than anything else seems to be the sad truth of this "moment" in time. Perhaps Britain's Ambassador, Sir C. Norton, delivered the best and most accurate summary of this dark chapter in Greek history:

The sufferings caused by the war and occupation, the growth of the Greek *maquis*, its demolitions and the inevitable German reprisals, the final outbreak of civil war and its suppression by British troops have left, besides material destruction, black memories, vendettas, fears and hatreds which will not die out in our time.⁸⁹

The question of whether or not British foreign policy in Greece between October 1944 and March 1947 was success or failure depends upon the criteria used in the analysis of these events. From the outset, the British Foreign Office was determined to re-install King George and that objective was accomplished. In addition, the British were determined to prevent Greece from falling under the Soviet sphere of influence. Whether that occurred because of the percentages agreement and the resulting British actions in Greece, the US involvement in Greece or a combination of the two, they also were successful in this objective. If in the long-term, Britain failed to exclusively retain Greece in her sphere of influence then it was at least kept in the Anglo-American sphere of influence. Whether or not the Americans were actually manipulated, they did assume Britain's responsibilities in Greece.⁹⁰ American involvement in Greece also represented a change in the balance of power in the world as the pre-war superpowers of Britain, France and Germany were replaced by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The British maintained their roles as advisors and observed the worsening conditions of the escalating civil war, but they did less and less to curb them. The British shifted from protesting a coalition government in 1943 to supporting one in 1945. They initially wanted to hold the plebiscite before the elections in 1946, but then decided to hold it later, and then there were many occa-

sions where the British gave no direction whatsoever to the Greek government, allowing it to flounder, as the British dealt with more pressing international concerns such as the Battle of the Bulge, the Yalta conference, the German surrender and the Polish Question. Greece was a problem for the West, and both the Americans and the British experienced a share of successes and setbacks in their policies. Of the three great powers involved in Greece, only the Soviet Union experienced a total failure of its foreign policy.

Stalin was extremely cautious when dealing with Greece because he did not wish to encourage Western intervention. He was so cautious that events in Greece overtook his policy decisions. The outbreak of Civil War at the end of 1946 convinced the United States of the USSR's militaristic intentions, whether they were real or perceived, and as a result, the "strategic commitment" of the United States to Greece that Stalin had hoped to avoid was realised.⁹¹ Although the Soviet Union officially maintained its "hands off" policy towards Greece from 1944 until the end of the civil war in 1949, the Greek Communists received aid from neighbouring Communist countries, but it was not nearly enough to compete with the American financial and military aid that was given to the Greek government. Even though they had not been directly involved in the affairs of Greece until 1947, the Americans kept well informed of the situation there, and they believed that the most pressing concern was the weakness of Greece's economy. Without emergency aid and "long-range" economic planning, the country would collapse, and endanger America's access to oil and its attempts to constrain Soviet expansion.⁹² A state department release of August 12th, 1947 stated:

It is the view of the United States government that Greece is in grave peril. This peril results from the guerrilla warfare now being waged against the Greek government by communist-led bands actively supported by Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and by the Communist party of Greece. It is perfectly clear the governments of these three northern countries are working in close conjunction with the Greek communists with a common objective—the establishment in Greece of a minority totalitarian government which would be subservient to the communist-controlled countries.⁹³

Not only did the Greek government receive substantial support from Britain and the United States while the KKE received only a few soviet military advisors and vague promises of support that were never followed up, the Greek government was internationally recognised. The KKE consistently opposed British initiatives in Greece, particularly where the economy and government were concerned, based on the assumption that at the proper moment the Soviet Union would lend its assistance. The success of British Policy in Greece was thus due to some degree to Stalin's fear of giving the British and the Americans an excuse to become involved in Eastern European affairs.

The war had bankrupted Britain. While it had managed to survive, and was successful in many of its objectives for Greece and its strategic interests in the Mediterranean, British success came a price. That price was mainly paid by the people of Greece, and for them British Policy must be considered a failure. While the Communists lamented loudly about the injustices of the postwar period in Greece, and the leaders of the various factions on all sides of the political spectrum in Greece fought amongst themselves, the Greek people were suffering. Going without food, clothing, medicine, and security was commonplace and it is in recognition of their sufferings and sacrifices that this study was undertaken.

Notes

¹Heinz Richter, *British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War, February 1945 to August 1946*. Translated by Marion Sarafis, (London: Merlin Press, 1986) p. vii.

²Robert Frasier, *Anglo-American Relations with Greece. The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-47*. (London: Macmillan Press, 1991) pp. 90-97, and G.M. Alexander, *The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-1947*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 245.

³Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece: the Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) p. 138.

⁴Bickam Sweet-Escott, "The Special Operations Executive in the Balkans," in *British Policy Between Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece*, edited by Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1975), pp. 10-12.

⁵Nicholas Hammond, *Venture Into Greece*, (London: William Kimber, 1983) p. 13.

⁶Richard Clogg, "The Special Operations Executive in Greece," in *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, edited by John O. Iatrides. (London: University

Press of New England, 1981) p. 111.

⁷William MacKenzie, *The Secret History of Special Operations Executive, 1940 to 1945*, (London: St Ermin's Press, 2002) p. 450.

⁸J.S Koliopoulos, *Greece and the British Connection, 1935-41*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 214.

⁹Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol. 1. (London: HMSO, 1970), p. 509- 511. See also McNeill, p. 38.

¹⁰Andre Gerolymatos, *Red Acropolis, Black Terror The Greek Civil War And the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry, 1943-1949*. (New York: Basic Books, 2004), pp. 38-39.

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 39- 41.

¹²Procopis Papastratis, *British Policy Towards Greece in the Second World War, 1941-1944*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 122.

¹³John, O. Iatrides, "Revolution or Self-Defence? Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War." In the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 2005, p 5.

¹⁴Papastratis, Procopis. *British Policy Towards Greece During the Second World War, 1941-44*. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p. 123.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 120.

¹⁶James Petiffer, *The Greeks: the Land and the People*. (London: Penguin Books, 1993, p. 34.

¹⁷Sweet-Escott, pp.10-11.

¹⁸Paul Preston and Michael Partridge eds., Preston, *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Parts III-IV, From 1940 through 1946, Series F, Europe*. MacGregor Knox, ed., Vols. 5, 6, 21-26 *Italy and South-eastern Europe, July 1940 - December 1946*. University Publications of America, 1998. Vol. 22, "Enclosure in no.10" (University Publications of America: 1998), p. 99.

¹⁹Papastratis, p. 151.

²⁰John Louis Hondros, *Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony, 1941-1944* (New York: Pella, 1983), p.75-77

²¹Gerolymatos, *Red Acropolis*, p. 46.

²²Gerolymatos, *Red Acropolis*, p. 41.

²³Mazower, "Introduction," *After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943-1960*, Mark Mazower, ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) p. 4.

²⁴C.M. Woodhouse, *The Apple of Discord*, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1948), p.50.

²⁵Gerolymatos, *Red Acropolis*, p. 44-46.

²⁶Bickam Sweet-Escott, p. 12.

²⁷C.M Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 37.

²⁸Peter Weiler, *Ernest Bevin*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 158.

²⁹Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982) , p. 244.

³⁰Henry, *Winston Churchill* (London: Macmillan Ltd, 1974, p. 548.

³¹Kenneth O. Morgan, *Labour in Power, 1945-1951*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) p. 47.

³²Preston, Vol. 26, Doc R 13134 / 4 / 19, p. 44.

³³Morgan, pp. 233-234.

³⁴G.M. Alexander, *The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece: 1944-1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 248. This belief may also have been a result of British control of Cyprus which afforded them a Mediterranean port regardless of developments in Greece.

³⁵J.T. Murphy, *Labour's Big Three: a Biographical Study of Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison and Ernest Bevin*, (London: the Bodley Head, 1948), pp. 222-223. Murphy wrote of Bevin "He never forgets that he belongs to the working class and to the people with whom he has worked."

³⁶Morgan, pp. 235-236

³⁷Morgan, p. 234.

³⁸Mary E. Glantz, *FDR and the Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Foreign Affairs*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 1, 179-180. In order to implement his policies towards the Soviets, which often met with fierce resistance from the various bureaucracies in his administration, FDR had reorganised the key departments that dealt with the USSR. By the summer of 1945, the reorganised departments were being replaced by a new bureaucracy; one that was determined to stand against further Soviet expansion. This shift occurred for many reasons but some of the main ones were the US support of global "open door" trade, a shift in public opinion against the USSR, and the Soviet actions in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

³⁹Iatrides, "Revolution or Self Defence?" pp.18-20. Stalin's paranoia was later demonstrated in Stalin's speech on February 9th 1946 when he declared that "peaceful coexistence" with the West was unlikely and that the USSR would continue to increase its power.

⁴⁰Alexander, p. 129.

⁴¹Murphy, pp 1-16.

⁴²Alexander, pp. 133-138.

⁴³Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, pp.252-253.

⁴⁴Alexander, p. 145.

⁴⁵Richter, pp. 289-290, Alexander, pp. 148-150. Further complicating matters was the pending expiration of the Anglo-Hellenic armed forces agreement on January 1, 1946. This agreement had freely provided the Greek Army with weapons rations and uniforms, and its expiration would mean that these items would soon have to be purchased.

⁴⁶Preston, Part III, Vol. 26, Doc R 20169 / 4 / 19, p. 347, Doc R 15714 / 5063 / 67, pp. 297-298, Doc R 18327 / 4 / 19, p. 333, Doc R 19237 / 4 / 19, pp. 335, 345. Coinciding with the end of Kannelopoulos' first and only term in office, on November 20th 1945 it took 67,000 drachmas to buy one gold sovereign.

⁴⁷Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 253.

⁴⁸Richter, pp. 291-292.

⁴⁹Preston, Part IV, Vol. 5, Doc R 155 / 1 / 19, 45. AMFOEGE provided for 663 American personnel and 195 vehicles to arrive in Greece to help administer the elections. For the remainder of the year, the main focus of the British was to help prepare Greece for the elections. When AMFOEGE left Athens on December 9 1945, they had decided that the British commitment to the elec-

tions would be 362 persons and 114 vehicles. AMFOGE returned to Athens on the 29th of December 1945, and its commander, Colonel Fiske of the US Army, declared that his headquarters would be established in Athens in early January 1946. The personnel of AMFOGE were trained in Italy and were then brought to Greece one month before the elections on the 31st of March 1946.

⁵⁰Iatrides, "Revolution or Self-Defence?" p. 20.

⁵¹Preston, Part IV, Vol. 6, Doc R 465 / 1 / 19, p.55.

⁵²Preston, Part IV, Vol. 5, Doc R 868 / 1 / 19, p. 93 and Doc R 650 / 2 / 19, p. 58.

⁵³*ibid.*, Doc R 1352 / 2 / 19, p. 59 and Doc R 868 / 1 / 19, p. 94 and Doc R 1375 / 1 / 19, p. 98 and Doc R 2196 / 1 / 19, p. 105.

⁵⁴Iatrides, "Revolution or Self-Defence?" p.18.

⁵⁵Preston, Part IV, Vol. 5, Doc R 2528 / 1 / 19, pp 108-109.

⁵⁶Iatrides, "Revolution or Self-Defence?" p. 21

⁵⁷Ole E. Smith, "Communist Perceptions, Strategy and Tactics, 1945-1949" in *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy*, John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds., (Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1995) p. 100.

⁵⁸Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 253, and Smith, p. 96.

⁵⁹Iatrides, "Revolution or Self-Defence?" p.20-22.

⁶⁰Smith, pp. 96-98.

⁶¹Iatrides, "Revolution or Self-Defence?" p. 21. Zachariadis would later choose to ignore the order, submitting an official request to the Soviets on September 12th 1946 for weapons. The KKE requested 8000 rifles, 15 heavy mortars, 50 light mortars, 250 machine guns, 10, 000 grenades and 150,000 dollars per month.

⁶²Morgan, p. 246-248.

⁶³Weiler, p. 158. Another reason for the troop withdrawal was to remove the Soviet justification for maintaining their troop levels in Eastern Europe.

⁶⁴Richter, p. 521. It is possible that it was at about this time in the British had decided to pass on the problem of Greece to the Americans, but the decision may also have been made a few months later as conditions in the rest of Europe were worsening.

⁶⁵Alexander, pp. 202-206.

⁶⁶Preston, Part IV, Vol. 6, Doc R 10729 / 8523 / 19, p. 38. Doc R 10729 / 8523 / 19, pp 39-40.

⁶⁷*ibid.*, Doc R 10729 / 8523 / 19, p.41.

⁶⁸Morgan, p. 252.

⁶⁹Close, David H. "The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950," in *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy*, John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds. (Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1995) pp.134-137.

⁷⁰Murphy, p. 232.

⁷¹Preston, Part IV, Vol. 6, Doc R 13501 / 1 / 19, pp. 57-58. In the Village of Kotili in Western Macedonia a garrison of gendarmes and soldiers was overcome; and 22 were killed and 21 were captured. The election results, cited in "Preston, Part IV, Vol. 6, Doc R 16571 / 1 / 19, p. 285," were a 68.9% vote in favour of the return of King George.

⁷²*ibid.*, Doc R 14232 / 1 / 19, p. 66.

⁷³*ibid.*, Doc R 15177 / 1 / 19, pp. 281-282, Doc R 15503 / 1 / 19, p. 282.

⁷⁴Smith, p. 96-98.

⁷⁵Preston, Part IV, Vol. 5, Doc R 16571 / 1 / 19, p. 285 Doc R 16958 / 1 / 19, pp. 299-300. See also *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports*, edited by John O. Iatrides, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980) pp. 701-703.

⁷⁶*ibid.*, Doc R 143 / 4 / 19, pp 117-118. It seemed that by this point every development, whether it was political, social, or economic, all contributed to the increasing violence.

⁷⁷Smith, p. 98.

⁷⁸Foreign Office, Public Records Office, *Private Collections* (London) "Atlee to Bevin, December 9th 1946," FO 800, p.475. It seemed as though Atlee was more aware of or more concerned with Britain's economic state than Bevin.

⁷⁹Foreign Office, "Bevin to Atlee, January 9th 1947," FO 800, p. 476.

⁸⁰Weiler, pp.161-162

⁸¹Harris, pp. 299, 304. Although Attlee initially intended to keep to the "short and arbitrary deadline' of March 31st, After Truman's declaration on the 12th of March, he consented to delaying the complete removal of Britain's armed forces until the Americans' aid had begun. Atlee ordered Minister Bevin, who was currently in Moscow, to inform Marshall that the British would stay in Greece past the March 31st 1947 deadline, to facilitate the transition. See, Preston, Part IV, Vol. 12, Doc R 3708 / 50 / G and Doc R 3935 / 50 / G, pp. 142-143, for the complete dispatch.

⁸²Preston, Part IV, Vol. 12, Doc UR 1248 / 25 / 851, p. 122, and, Iatrides, "Revolution or Self-Defence?" p. 23. In the same month as a reaction to the American announcement, the KKE decided that the Democratic Army of Greece (the DSE) should go on the offensive. Zachariades was now well aware of the growing tension between the USSR and the United States, and, foreseeing greater American involvement in Greece in the future, he wrote to Stalin on January 12th 1947 begging him for more money. The result of the letter was a contribution of 33,000 dollars from several communist parties

⁸³Alexander, pp. 243-244.

⁸⁴Close, David H. *Greece Since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society*. (London: Pearson Education, 2002) p. 32.

⁸⁵Preston, Part IV, Vol. 12, Doc R 3426 / 50 / 19, pp. 138-141.

⁸⁶Preston, Part IV, Vol. 12., Doc T 6802 / 6802 / 379, p. 143.

⁸⁷Robert Frasier, *Anglo American Relations with Greece. The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-1947*, (London: MacMillan, 1991) pp.179-181. The debate on these issues is ongoing, exemplified by the works of Frasier and Alexander.

⁸⁸Howard Jones, *A New Kind of War: America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 154.

⁸⁹Preston, Part IV, Vol. 5, Doc R 8332 / 1 / 19, p. 327.

⁹⁰Frasier, pp. 145-154.

⁹¹Peter J. Stavrakis, *Moscow and Greek Communism: 1944-1949*. (London: Cornell University Press, 1989) pp. 228-229.

⁹²Jones, p. 26.

⁹³Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949*, Vol. 1 (New York: Arno Press, 1971) p. 765.

